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 ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I present two distinct essays in economics of culture and institutions that can be read
independently from one another.  In Chapter 2, using the European Social Survey data, I investigate the impact of
increased educational attainment, induced by compulsory schooling reforms, on religiosity and superstitious beliefs.
I find consistently negative effects of education on religiosity, superstitious beliefs, social religious acts (attending
religious services) and solitary religious acts (the frequency of praying).  In Chapter 3, I examine the impact of
“culture of leisure” and tax rates on labor force participation and hours worked of second-generation immigrants
residing in 26 European countries.  The results show that for women, both taxes and culture of leisure impact
participation and hours worked.  For men, taxes influence labor supply both at the intensive and the extensive
margins, but culture of leisure has no impact.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of two distinct essays within the broad field of economics of culture and
institutions.  In Chapter 2, I investigate the impact of increased educational attainment, induced by compulsory
schooling reforms, on religiosity outcomes such as reported religiosity, frequency of church attendance, and prayer.
I then extend the analysis to study the impact of increased schooling on superstitious beliefs.  In the following
chapter, I examine the impact of “culture of leisure” and tax rates on labor force participation and hours worked of
second-generation immigrants residing in 26 European countries.  Chapter 4 summarizes the findings of these two
essays.
1.1. Compulsory Schooling Laws and Formation of Beliefs: Education, Religion and Superstition
The long-standing secularization hypothesis suggests that as education and standards of living increase, the
individuals should have less need to rely on supernatural forces, both in the form of organized religion and
superstitious beliefs. In Chapter 2, I put this theory to test. Specifically, I examine whether increased educational
attainment reduces individuals’ religiosity, frequency of church attendance, and prayer, as well as superstitious
beliefs.
An individual’s education and the level of his or her religiosity are likely to be correlated with a number of
unobserved individual characteristics, making it difficult to disentangle the causal impact of educational attainment
on the outcomes of interest. I address this problem by using exposure to compulsory schooling reforms as a source
of exogenous variation in the individuals’ years of completed education.
To pinpoint the effect of education on religiosity and associated behaviors, I employ micro data from the
European Social Survey (ESS) and analyze individuals residing in 14 European countries, greatly expanding the
geographic coverage of the previous literature. The ESS data also allows me to investigate the impact of education
on various dimensions of religiosity, ranging from solitary religious acts (praying) to social religious acts (attending
religious services) in a unified framework, further advancing the existing studies. I find large negative effects of
schooling on self-reported degree of religiosity, the frequency of praying, and the frequency of attending religious
services.
I further contribute to the existing literature by utilizing the 1999 and 2008 waves of the European Values
Study and investigating the impact of an increase in education on superstitious beliefs, prompted by the same
compulsory education reforms in Europe. I find that additional years of schooling reduce individuals’ propensity to
2believe in the protective power of lucky charms, as well as decrease people’s tendency to consult horoscopes and to
take horoscopes into account in daily life. The fact that education reduces both the superstitious beliefs of
individuals and their affiliation with the organized religion suggests that improved cognition and ability for critical
thinking may be one of the main channels through which educational attainment affects the outcomes of interest.
In the models, I include country-specific cohort trends, controlling for the general secularization trend in
Europe. Chapter 2 and Appendix A show that my results are robust to a variety of specification tests. Furthermore, I
conduct several placebo tests. Specifically, I create fake reform dates by moving the actual dates of the reforms back
and forth a couple of years. The placebo results reveal that there is no impact of the fake schooling reforms on
individuals’ educational attainment. Similarly, there is no impact of being exposed to a fake reform on the outcomes
of interest, which supports the validity of my main results.
1.2. Impact of Taxes Rates and Culture of Leisure on Labor Supply in Europe
Recent macroeconomic literature has suggested a number of potential explanations for the observation that
there are substantial differences between countries in average annual hours worked per working age population.
Among other factors, these explanations have underlined the importance of tax rates on labor and consumption
(Prescott 2004, Ohanian et al. 2008, McDaniel 2011) and the role of preferences for leisure (Blanchard 2004,
Alesina et al. 2006). In Chapter 3, I complement the existing macroeconomic studies and offer the first estimates of
the impact of tax rates and culture of leisure on individual labor supply in the same framework.
I focus on second-generation immigrants who reside in 26 European countries. These individuals are born
in Europe and are exposed to the institutional structures, labor market conditions and tax burdens of their residence
countries. Their fathers had migrated from up to 47 countries of origin. I assume that culture of leisure is transmitted
from the fathers to the offspring and use average responses in the fathers’ countries of origin to questions such as
“How important is leisure in your life?” as measures of culture of leisure.
The models control for individual attributes, as well as for a variety of country of origin and country of
destination characteristics, such as the unemployment rate, per capita income, legal origin, and religious make-up. I
find that both tax rates and culture of leisure are significant determinant of female labor supply, both at the extensive
and the intensive margin. On the other hand, for men, culture of leisure has no impact on their labor supply, but tax
rates negatively influence both labor force participation and hours usually worked in a week. These results are
3robust to excluding countries representing the largest Muslim immigrant groups, as well as analyzing tax rates and
culture of leisure variables separately, while controlling for country-of-origin and country-of-residence fixed effects.
Chapter 4 summarizes the findings of these two studies.
4CHAPTER 2. COMPULSORY SCHOOLING LAWS AND FORMATION OF BELIEFS:
 EDUCATION, RELIGION AND SUPERSTITION
“The state … derives no inconsiderable advantage from [the instruction of uneducated citizens]. The more they are
instructed the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations,
frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders.”
Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations; V.1.189
2.1.  Introduction
A long line of philosophers and social scientists, ranging from Durkheim to Weber, have argued that
increased levels of education would diminish the need for religious adherence.  Along the same lines, as summarized
by Becker, Nagler and Woessmann (2014), increased education and advances in scientific knowledge are assumed
to be leading sources of secularization of societies in Europe during the late 19th and the early 20th centuries.  If
education improves cognition and the ability for critical thinking, more educated people should be less likely to
believe in supernatural forces.  On the other hand, it can be argued that an increase in educational attainment can
increase religiosity, especially at lower levels of education.  For example, an increase in education may increase
individuals’ literacy which would allow them to read complicated religious texts, which in turn may lead to
enhanced religiosity.1
 At the country level, education, the degree of religiosity, the level of economic development and the extent
of democracy are correlated.  More educated countries on average tend to be less religious.  They also have stronger
democracies as well as higher per capita incomes.  It is, of course, not possible to draw cause-and-effect inference
from such cross-country data regarding the impact of education on religiosity and other outcomes.  This is because
the extent of religiosity of a country and its level of economic and democratic development are endogenous,
potentially influencing each other.  Thus, a credible empirical design necessitates some exogenous change in
education that can be used to analyze the relationship between education and religion.
I employ data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and use schooling reforms in 14 European countries
as a source of exogenous variation.  Specifically, I use an individual’s exposure to a compulsory schooling reform as
an instrument for his or her level of education and show that such an exposure increases years of completed
education.  I analyze how individuals’ propensity to identify themselves as religious and the extent of their religious
activities are impacted by their education levels.  The ability to analyze both religiosity and the extent of religious
1 Similarly, if education improves the aptitude for foreign languages, people can read religious texts in their original
language such as Hebrew, Arabic or Latin, which could have a positive impact on their religiosity.
5activity (e.g. attending religious services and praying) is important.  This is because some previous research reported
a positive association between education and church attendance, which can be attributed to the premise that
education increases the returns to social activities.  According to this hypothesis, the more educated attend religious
services more often not because education enhances religiosity but because the more educated benefit more from
attending religious services due to its network benefits (Glaeser and Sacerdote 2008).  Because I have data on the
frequency of attending religious services as well as data on various measures of religiosity and the frequency of
praying, I can investigate the impact of education on various dimensions of religiosity, ranging from solitary
religious acts (praying) to social religious acts (attending religious services).
I also utilize data from the European Values Study (EVS) for the years 1999 and 2008 to investigate the
impact of an increase in education on superstitious beliefs, prompted by the same compulsory education reforms in
Europe.  I analyze whether additional years of schooling alter individuals’ beliefs in horoscopes and lucky charms
and the extent to which people take into account horoscopes in their daily lives.
The origins of superstitious beliefs have been investigated by psychologists, sociologists and
anthropologists since the late 19th century.  As summarized by Vyse (2014), theories have been developed to explain
the reasons behind superstitious beliefs and practices, ranging from the significance of uncertainty about the future
to the impact of a society’s culture and collective psychology.  Religion and superstition are related in that both
involve believing in supernatural forces and there is overlap between the two.  In many societies the practice of
superstitious acts has religious connotations, and organized religions have ceremonies that are borrowed from
superstitious rites (also called magic) of pagan cultures. For example, Vyse (2014, p. 13) writes that:
During the 16th and much of the 17th centuries, religious objects were the source of much magic.  To
encourage converts to a new religious order, the priests of the medieval church in England found it
necessary to incorporate a large measure of pagan supernaturalism.  Anglo-Saxons commonly worshipped
wells, trees, and stones; eventually a wide variety of powers were attributed to the consecrated objects of
the church. Holy water was a particularly versatile agent.  To avail themselves of its reputed curative
powers, parishioners often drank it, sprinkled it on children’s cradles or on ailing cattle, and splashed it on
their houses to ward off evil spirits and protect against lightning.2
It is, of course, the case that a particular religion’s beliefs and practices can be perceived as superstition by
another religion.  In this chapter I consider such behaviors as believing in fortune-telling or in horoscopes, or having
2 Another example of superstition intermingling with religion is the practice of “faith healing” which has a long
tradition in the Roman Catholic Church. Over the centuries thousands of Catholics have traveled all over the world
to be healed by miracle cures, and as detailed in Woodward (1990), to this day, to be declared as a saint by the
Vatican, the candidate is required to have performed some miracle which is generally the magical treatment of a
medical condition (Vyse 2014, p. 7).
6faith in the powers of lucky charms as indicators of superstitious beliefs.  Such actions also involve reliance on
supernatural forces, but they are outside of the belief structure of mainstream religions.3
Using exposure to education reforms as an instrument for years of education, I find large negative effects of
schooling on religiosity, the frequency of praying and attending religious services.  For example, one additional year
of schooling reduces individual’s propensity to pray at least once a month day by almost 9 percentage points.
Likewise, an additional year of full-time education reduces the propensity to attend religious services at least once a
week by about 9 percentage points.  I also find that schooling reduces the propensity to believe in the protective
power of lucky charms, and it decreases the tendency to consult horoscopes and to take into account horoscopes in
daily life.
My identification strategy is based on the comparison of individuals who are four years apart in age.  I
assume that the intensity of religious beliefs would not have changed during this relatively short time period absent
the impact of increased mandatory education.  My models include country-specific cohort trends, thus controlling
for the country-specific secular tendencies. Additionally, I conduct several placebo tests. If religiosity has a strong
time trend and a tendency to change rather rapidly over the course of a few years, then moving the actual dates of
the reforms back and forth a couple of years (creating fake reform dates) would produce a negative impact of the
reform on religiosity and superstition, when in fact none exists.  The placebo tests reveal that this is not the case.
2.2.  Existing Literature
It has long been argued that as standards of living go up and people become more educated and more
analytically oriented, the need to rely on supernatural forces should diminish, both in the form of believing in
superstition and participating in organized religion. This view dates back to the works of Hume, Marx, and Weber,
among others.  Recent laboratory experiments support the hypothesis that analytic processing can promote religious
and psychic disbelief (Gervais and Norenzayan 2012, Pennycook et al. 2014, Gray and Gallo 2016).4  Nonetheless,
empirical evidence in support of negative effect of education on religiosity is mixed.
3 I thank an anonymous referee for this insight.
4 In addition to potentially influencing individual beliefs and preferences, education increases the opportunity cost of
time and accessibility of social activities that are substitutes to organized religious activities.  Relatedly, Gruber and
Hungerman (2008) show that church attendance and going to the mall are two competing, substitute activities.
7Earlier studies often documented a positive relationship between education and religious activity
(Iannaccone 1998).  Similarly, in their cross-country analysis McCleary and Barro (2006) found that religiosity was
positively associated with education.  Using the World Values Survey data over 80 countries from 1981 to 2001 as
well as other data sets covering longer periods, Norris and Inglehart (2004) described the evolution of religious
participation, religious values and beliefs by country.  They presented evidence that while advanced industrial
societies, which have high average education, have generally trended away from religiosity, the same was not true
for developing countries that have low education levels.
Franck and Iannaccone (2013) analyzed a panel of 10 developed countries, for which a measure of church
attendance was created in five-year intervals between the 1920s and the 1990s. While they could not find an impact
of country education on average church attendance, they reported a negative relationship between average school
spending and church attendance. Becker et al. (2014) used data from 61 German cities over eight waves between
1890 and 1930.  Controlling for city fixed-effects, they found that an increase in advanced-school enrollment in
those cities was negatively related to Protestant church attendance.
Using micro data of the British National Child Development Study, Brown and Taylor (2007) reported a
positive relationship between church attendance and individuals’ education.   Arias-Vazques (2012) employed data
from the Monitoring the Future survey in the U.S. and used child labor and compulsory attendance laws as an
instrument for schooling.  He found a negative impact of education on religiosity.  Hungerman (2014) ran province-
year level regressions for Canada and reported that the fraction of people with no religious affiliation in a province
went up if average education was higher (due to province-level education reforms, enacted mostly in the 1950s and
1960s).   Cesur and Mocan (2013), which is similar to this work in design, employed individual-level data from
Turkey.  They investigated the impact of increased education due to an education reform that changed the
compulsory years of schooling from 5 to 8 years.  They found that an increase in educational attainment decreased
women’s propensity to identify themselves as religious, lowered their tendency to wear a religious head cover (head
scarf, turban or burka), increased the tendency for modernity, and decreased their propensity to vote for an Islamic
party.
Since the late 1960s, researchers have been investigating the predictors of superstition.  These studies
typically use surveys of beliefs, based on small samples.  For example, Jahoda (1968) surveyed 280 male students
from the University of Ghana to analyze the relationship between the strength of their supernatural beliefs and the
8type of coursework taken and the length of residence at the University.  He could not find a significant relationship
between any particular type of course taken or the tenure at the university and magico-mythical beliefs of the
students.  On the other hand, using a sample of 113 students, 352 university professors and 251 members of the
general public, Otis and Alcock (1982) reported that university professors are significantly more skeptical than
students and members of the general public regarding paranormal phenomena.  Pennycook et al. (2012) conducted
two analyses based on 223 and 267 people, respectively, and reported that an analytic cognitive style was negatively
associated with religious and paranormal beliefs.5 In a study that used a larger sample, Aarnio and Lindeman (2005)
examined the responses of 3,141 Finnish students from 14 universities and six vocational schools and found that
university students had weaker paranormal beliefs than vocational students and that those majoring in medicine and
psychology had the weakest and those in education and theology had the strongest paranormal beliefs.  In summary,
these studies, generally suggest that education is negatively correlated with beliefs in superstition and paranormal
forces.  Another regularity reported by previous work is that women have stronger religious and superstitious beliefs
than men.
2.3. Empirical Strategy
The relationship of interest between education and religiosity or superstition is given by Equation (2.1).R୧୩ୡ୲ = β଴ + βଵEducation୧୩ୡ୲ + X୧୩ୡ୲ᇱ Ω +μୡ + η୲ + λ୩ × Birthyear + ϵ୧୩ୡ୲,       (2.1)
where R୧୩ୡ୲ denotes a particular outcome, such as religiosity, the frequency of attendance to religious services, the
frequency of praying, or various indicators of superstitious beliefs, for individual i, born in year k and country c;
interviewed in country c and year t. Education୧୩ୡ୲ stands for the number of completed years of full-time education
of the individual,  μୡ and η୲  represent fixed effects for the individual’s country of residence and year of survey,
respectively, and λୡ୩ stands for country-specific cohort trends. The vector X୧୩ୡ୲ᇱ  includes personal characteristics
such as age, sex, self-perceived ethnic minority status, an indicator for whether the respondent lives in a city, and the
immigration and employment status of the mother of the respondent.6 7
5 Paranormal beliefs are those hypothetical occurrences and processes that are considered as impossible by current
scientific knowledge. These include extrasensory perception such as psychic ability.  Some analysts include beliefs
in magic, superstition, astrology, and religion into this category (Irwin 1993).
6 The results, not reported here in the interest of space, are robust to excluding the potentially endogenous variables
City, Mother Working, and Mother Immigrant from the models.
7 The vector X does not contain ethnic minority status and mother’s immigration and employment statuses in
superstition models because these variables are not consistently available in the EVS data.
9The error term ϵ୧୩ୡ୲ in Equation (2.1) contains unobserved individual attributes that influence both the
individual’s education and religiosity, which induces bias in the coefficient on education in a straightforward OLS
estimation. To uncover the causal relationship between education and religiosity, I use individuals’ exposure to a
compulsory schooling reform as an instrument for reported years of full-time education completed.
The European countries I examine have implemented education reforms that increased the mandatory years
of schooling by one or more years, mostly in the 1960s and the 1970s.  As are result, in these countries, children
who were different in age merely by 1-2 years were exposed to different levels of compulsory schooling, which had
an impact on their educational attainment.
The first stage regression below specifies the impact of exposure to the reform on completed schooling.Education୧୩ୡ୲ = γ଴ + γଵReform୩ୡ + X୧୩ୡ୲ᇱ Ω +μୡ + η୲+ λ୩ × Birthyear + ξ୧୩ୡ୲,       (2.2)
where Reform୩ୡ is an indicator for whether the individual born in year k was treated by a compulsory schooling
reform in country c. It takes the value of one if the person was born after the birth year of the first cohort potentially
affected by the reform, and zero if the person was born before the cut-off.  I omit individuals who were at the age
cut-off of the law when the law was enacted (the pivotal cohort) because the extent of this cohort’s exposure to the
education reform is unclear.8 I select individuals born up to four years before the pivotal cohort and up to four years
after the pivotal cohort as control and treatment groups, respectively. This window is small enough to avoid the
potentially confounding effects of other societal changes that may have taken place, but large enough to provide
sample sizes that allow the models to be estimated with power.9 The estimated standard errors are clustered at the
regional level, which provides 131 clusters.10  I also report bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the country
level, which does not alter the inference.11
Because the respondents cannot choose the date of their birth, it is plausible to assume that their exposure
to an education reform is uncorrelated with their unobserved personal characteristics that would determine both
8 As described in the Robustness section 2.7.3 and Appendix A, Table A.4, treating the pivotal cohorts as part of the
treatment group did not alter the results appreciably.
9 My results are robust to using the bandwidths of 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 years around the pivotal cohort. These results are
not reported in the interest of space.
10 The ESS data report the region of the interview in each country, although this variable is not always consistent
across rounds of the ESS surveys. For example, in the first four rounds ESS divides Belgium into three regions:
Flemish, Brussels, and Walloon. For rounds 5 and 6, Belgium is divided into 11 smaller regions that correspond to
the NUTS 2 classification. I aggregated these 11 regions into Flemish, Brussel, and Walloon to be compatible with
the first four rounds.
11 For Germany these standard errors are clustered at the state level as the education reform is implemented at the
state level in Germany.
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religiosity and the length of acquired schooling. However, by construction of the sample, individuals in the control
group are a few years younger than those in the treatment group.  In the analyses, the average age difference
between the treatment and control groups is four years in the ESS sample, and seven years in the EVS sample,
suggesting that any detected impact of education is unlikely due to cohort differences.  Furthermore, the models
control for age and its quadratic12, and country-specific cohort trends. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the
possibility that cohorts that are a few years apart can be different in their religious and superstitious beliefs not
because of differential years of mandated schooling they were exposed to, but because of a general trend towards
secularism.  In other words, it is possible for the exclusion restriction to be invalid.  To address this concern, I create
placebo reforms by moving the reform dates in each country two and three years back, and two and three years
forward in comparison to the actual dates.  As explained later in the chapter, using these placebo dates eliminates
significance in the first-stage regressions and in the reduced form regressions, supporting the hypothesis that the
results are not an artifact of general trends toward secularity.
2.4.  Education Reforms in Europe
The information on education reforms was collected from several sources, initially from the tables and data
appendices of recent papers that use European compulsory education reforms as a source of identification.13 I have
also consulted other sources, including the Education Reforms Database compilation by Garrouste (2010) and the
Eurydice database on education systems in Europe. The choice of countries included in the analysis was limited by
two concerns.   First, because the European Social Survey (ESS) was administered from 2002 to 2013, I cannot use
the reforms that were implemented in the early 20th century because even older people in the sample would not have
been born yet.  Second, I chose the compulsory schooling laws for which I could clearly identify the first potentially
affected cohort.14 I provide details on information sources for each of the reforms and the explanation of choice for
the year of birth of the first potentially affected cohort in Appendix B.
12 The results are robust to using age dummies instead of a quadratic in age. These results are not reported in the
interest of space.
13 Examples are Brunello et al. (2009), Brunello et al. (2013), Borgonovi et al. (2010), Fort et al. (2011), Grenet
(2013), Pischke and Wachter (2008), Clark and Royer (2013).
14 As described by previous researchers (Bratti and Braga 2013, Meghir and Palme 2005, Sousa et al. 2015) some
countries implemented these reforms in ways that make it difficult to clearly isolate the cohorts exposed to the
reform.  Three examples are Italy, Portugal, and Sweden (see Appendix B).  Dropping these countries from the
analysis had no impact on the results.
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A model proposed by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) predicts that people will invest more in religious capital
when they are close to the end of their life cycle, because the gains of religious investment are only realized after
death. Alternatively, religiosity can increase with age as a result of habit or taste formation (Iannaccone 1998).
Thus, I restrict the sample to people who are younger than 65.  However, as part of the sensitivity analyses, I re-
estimated the models by using everybody surveyed as long as they are in the relevant birth cohorts, which did not
alter the results. These results are reported in Appendix A, Table A.2.
Table 2.1 presents the countries that are included in the analysis along with key information on their
education reforms. For each country, I report the date of the reform, the year of birth of the first cohort affected by
the reform, as well as the change in the number of years of compulsory schooling and the change in the minimum
school leaving age. The reforms have increased compulsory education by 1 to 4 years and the first affected cohorts
were born as early as 1942 (Schleswig-Holstein, Germany) and as late as 1970 (Belgium).  The overwhelming
majority of the individuals in the sample (98 percent), however, are born after World War II.
Table 2.1
Compulsory Schooling Reforms for the Countries in the Analysis
Country Reformdate
First cohort
fully affected by
the reform
Change in years
of compulsory
schooling
Change in
minimum
school leaving
age
Age at school
entry
Austria 1966 1953 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
Belgium 1983 1970 8 to 12 14 to 18 6
Denmark 1971 1958 7 to 9 14 to 16 7
France15 1959 1953 8 to 10 14 to 16 6
Greece 1976 1965 6 to 9 12 to 15 6
Hungary 1961 1948 8 to 10 14 to 16 6
Ireland 1972 1959 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
Italy16 1963 1951 5 to 8 11 to 14 6
Poland17 1961 1953 7 to 8 14 to 15 7
Portugal 1964 1957 4 to 6 12 to 14 8
Spain18 1970 1958 6 to 8 12 to 14 6
Sweden19 1949-1962 1952 7 to 9 14 to 16 7
15 The reform was implemented in 1967 and affected all those born after January 1, 1953. Source: Grenet (2013).
16 I follow d’Hombres and Nunziata (2015) and Bratti and Braga (2013) and code the first potentially affected cohort
as those born in 1950.
17 According to Joanna Jung-Miklaszewska (2003), the 8th grade (Form VIII) was organized in the school year
1966/67, which makes those born in 1952 the pivotal cohort.
18 I follow Brunello et al. (2009), Gathmann et al. (2014), Pons and Gonzalo (2002) and code the first potentially
affected cohort as those who were 13 years old or younger in 1970, i.e. those born in 1957.
19 The reform was implemented gradually across municipalities. I follow Borgonovi et al. (2010) and d’Hombres
and Nunziata (2015) and code the first potentially affected cohort as those born in 1951.
12
Table 2.1 (Continued)
Country Reformdate
First cohort
fully affected
by the reform
Change in
years of
compulsory
schooling
Change in
minimum
school leaving
age
Age at school
entry
United Kingdom
   England and Wales 1972 1958 10 to 11 15 to 16 5
   Scotland20 1976 1959 10 to 11 15 to 16 5
   Northern Ireland 1972 1958 10 to 11 15 to 16 5
Germany21
   Schleswig-Holstein 1956 1942 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
   Niedersachsen 1962 1948 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
   Bremen 1958 1944 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
   Nordrhein-Westphalia 1967 1954 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
   Hessen 1967 1954 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
   Rheinland-Pfalz 1967 1954 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
   Baden-Wurtenberg 1967 1954 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
   Bayern 1969 1956 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
Saarland 1964 1950 8 to 9 14 to 15 6
In the case of Germany, the increase in the years of compulsory schooling from 8 to 9 years  took place at
different points in time in ten different regions of West Germany. I used the coding of the reforms and of the first
cohorts affected from Pischke and Wachter (2005). Since neither the birth region of the respondent nor the region of
residence at the time of schooling is reported in the ESS, I use the current region of residence as a proxy for region
of residence at the time of schooling. This introduces measurement error, possibly attenuating the effect of the
exposure to the reform on years of completed full-time education.22
Other researchers have investigated the impact of these European education reforms on some health
outcomes.  For example, Brunello, Fabbri and Fort (2013) used the same design and analyzed the impact of
education on body mass index in selected European countries.  They determined the reform date in Austria as 1962.
Fort, Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer (2011), however, write that the reform law in Austria was passed in 1962, but it
20 Fort (2006), Gathmann et al. (2014), and Brunello et al. (2013), report 1976 as the date of the reform. However,
Gathmann et al. (2014) and Fort (2006) still suggest those born in 1958 as the first potentially affected cohort; I
follow them and code those born in 1958 as the pivotal cohort for Scotland.
21 Pischke and Wachter (2005) also report 1949 reform in Hamburg; I cannot use this reform because no individuals
in the sample were born early enough. Moreover, neither the birth region of the respondent nor the region of
residence at the time of schooling is reported in the ESS. I use the current region of residence as a proxy.
22 The extent of this concern can be gauged by using the following question from the first round of the ESS: “How
long have you lived in this area?” Only 18% of German respondents in the first round stated that they lived in the
area since age 14. Still, this number may be overestimating regional migration because the exact meaning of “area”
in the question is unclear. Dropping Germany from the sample did not alter the results.
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was implemented on September 1, 1966 (Fort et al. 2011, p. 39).  Thus, I chose 1966 as the effective date of the
reform in Austria.  However, estimating the models using 1962 as the reform date in Austria did not change the
results.
2.5. Religiosity Data
I use six currently available rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS). These six rounds of the ESS were
conducted in various years between 2002 and 2013 and cover 35 European countries, 14 of which are included in
the sample.  These 14 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The core module of the survey is administered in all
rounds and asks the respondents about their socio-economic circumstances, health, well-being, human values, and
political engagement, as well as about their religiosity. I restrict the sample to non-immigrants, who are citizens of
the country of the interview, who do not report being in school as their main activity in the last seven days.
The ESS asks its respondents the following question: “How religious are you?”, with possible answers
ranging from 0 “Not at all religious” to 10 “Very religious.”  I create dummy variables that classify people as
religious if their reported religiosity is above the value of 7 (or, alternatively, above 8 or 9).  In addition, I calculate
country-specific distributions of religiosity and create indicators of whether the respondent belongs to the top 30, top
20 or top 10 percent of religiosity distribution in his/her own country.
The ESS also contains several questions pertaining to religious activities of the respondents.  Measures of
religious service attendance are based on the following question: “How often do you attend religious services apart
from special occasions?”  Possible answers include seven categories of frequency, ranging from 1 “Every day” to 7
“Never.”23  I convert these responses into two dummy variables.  The first one takes the value of one if the
respondent attends religious services at least once a week, and zero otherwise.  The second dummy variable takes
the value of one if the individual attends religious services at least once a month, and zero otherwise.
The third set of indicators of religious behavior is based on individuals’ frequency of praying,
corresponding to the ESS question “How often do you pray apart from the times at religious services?” Possible
answers range from 1 “Every day” to 7 “Never.”  I convert the original categorical variable into four different
dichotomous variables that take the value of one (respectively) if the respondent reports praying: 1) at least once a
23 The full set of possible answers includes 1 “Every day”, 2 “More than once a week”, 3 “Once a week”, 4 “At least
once a month”, 5 “Only on special holy days”, 6 “Less often”, and 7 “Never.”
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month, 2) at least once a week, 3) more than once a week, and 4) every day.   As I explain later in the paper, I also
classify each variable into three categories and run ordered probit models.
Table 2.2.A reports the descriptive statistics of the outcome variables regarding religiosity.  The top panel
of Table 2.2.A shows that the extent of religiosity is lower in the treatment group (those with more education) in
comparison to those who are in the control group, although the differences are not substantial.    The middle panel of
Table 2.2.A reveals that about 20 percent of the control group attends religious services at least weekly, while 17
percent do so in the treatment group. The proportion of people who go to a temple (church, synagogue, mosque,
etc.) at least once a month is lower for the treatment group as well.
The bottom panel of Table 2.2.A shows that people report praying more frequently than attending religious
services.  This is expected as praying is a less time-intensive activity.  The difference between the treated and the
non-treated groups is also evident for prayer: about 24 percent of the former group pray every day, while about 21
percent of the latter group do so.  Similarly, as shown in the top panel of Table 2.2.A, individuals in the treatment
group are less likely to belong to the top 30, 20, or 10 percent of religiosity distribution in their own country.24
Table 2.2.B displays descriptive statistics of the control variables of the ESS data. The treatment group has
higher education: about 12.5 completed years of full-time education on average, in comparison to average education
of about 11.8 years in the control group.  I present, in Figures 2.1 to 2.14, the average years of completed full-time
education by year of birth for each country.  Because the education reform in Germany was implemented in different
years in different regions of the country, I re-origined each region, stacked them together and plotted the graph for
Germany such that the horizontal axis measures the distance in years from the year of the reform’s implementation.
The vertical line marks the birth year of the first cohort potentially affected by the reform in the country (the pivotal
cohort, not included in the regressions).25 It is evident from the figures that average schooling has increased after the
reforms.  In Table 2.2.B, I also document that 79 percent of individuals had completed the new compulsory level of
education before it was effective, while the proportion of people who completed the compulsory level of education
rose to 89 percent in the cohorts who were impacted by the reforms.
24 Note that in Table 2.2.A the mean values of these variables are not equal to 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1 because of the
rounding necessitated by the discrete nature of the religiosity variable.
25 According to Grenet (2013), the French reform of 1959 affected all people born on or after January 1, 1953.
Therefore, for France I code the 1953 cohort as part of the treatment group and do not omit it from the regressions.
Thus, the vertical line in Figure 4 is between 1952 and 1953. Re-estimating the models by omitting the 1953 cohort
of France does not change the results, which are reported in Appendix A, Table A.3.
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Table 2.2.A
Descriptive Statistics of Religiosity Variables
Outcome All
Treatment Control
Group Group
Religiosity
==1 if in on a scale 0 to 10 individual’s religiosity is 8, 9, or 10, and 0
otherwise
0.188 0.179 0.198
(0.391) (0.384) (0.399)
==1 if in on a scale 0 to 10 individual’s religiosity is 9 or 10, and 0
otherwise
0.084 0.077 0.092
(0.277) (0.266) (0.288)
==1 if in on a scale 0 to 10 individual’s religiosity is 10, and 0 otherwise 0.042 0.038 0.047
(0.201) (0.191) (0.211)
==1 if individual belongs to the top 30% of religiosity distribution in her
country, 0 otherwise
0.382 0.368 0.397
(0.486) (0.482) (0.489)
==1 if individual belongs to the top 20% of religiosity distribution in her
country, 0 otherwise
0.259 0.246 0.273
(0.438) (0.431) (0.445)
==1 if individual belongs to the top 10% of religiosity distribution in her
country, 0 otherwise
0.157 0.146 0.168
(0.363) (0.353) (0.374)
N 16323 8439 7884
Frequency of Attending Religious Services
==1 if individual attends religious services (apart from special occasions) at
least once a month, 0 otherwise
0.313 0.297 0.331
(0.464) (0.457) (0.471)
==1 if individual attends religious services (apart from special occasions) at
least once a week, 0 otherwise
0.188 0.174 0.203
(0.391) (0.380) (0.402)
N 16337 8448 7889
Frequency of Praying
==1 if individual prays (apart from religious services) at least once a month,
0 otherwise
0.460 0.448 0.473
(0.498) (0.497) (0.499)
==1 if individual prays (apart from religious services) at least once a week, 0
otherwise
0.400 0.387 0.415
(0.490) (0.487) (0.493)
==1 if individual prays (apart from religious services) several times a week
or more, 0 otherwise
0.330 0.319 0.343
(0.470) (0.466) (0.475)
==1 if individual prays (apart from religious services) every day, 0 otherwise
0.223 0.209 0.239
(0.417) (0.407) (0.427)
N 16163 8355 7808
The data is from the ESS survey and covers years from 2002 to 2013. The treatment group consists of individuals
born up to four years after the first cohort potentially affected by an education reform. The control group consists of
those born up to four years before this cohort. With the exception of France, the first potentially affected cohort is
not included, because the extent of their exposure to an education reform is unclear. The sample is restricted to non-
immigrants, citizens of the country of the interview, who do not report being in school as their main activity in the
last 7 days. Survey weights are used. The mean values of the last three variables in the top panel are not equal to 0.3,
0.2, and 0.1 because of the rounding necessitated by the discrete nature of the reported religiosity variable.
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Table 2.2.B
Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables: ESS Sample
Variable Variable Definitions All Treatment ControlGroup Group
Years of schooling Number of years of full-time education completed
12.208 12.545 11.841
(4.030) (3.869) (4.169)
Proportion of people who have completed the new compulsory level of
education or higher
0.841 0.888 0.789
(0.366) (0.315) (0.408)
Age Age of the respondent
51.384 49.208 53.758
(6.661) (6.302) (6.216)
Male ==1 if male, 0 otherwise
0.467 0.466 0.468
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
Ethnic minority ==1 if belongs to minority ethnic group in country
0.018 0.019 0.017
(0.132) (0.137) (0.127)
City ==1 if respondent lives in a big city, 0 otherwise
0.160 0.166 0.154
(0.367) (0.372) (0.361)
Mother working ==1 if mother was working when the respondentwas 14 years old, 0 otherwise
0.436 0.463 0.405
(0.496) (0.499) (0.491)
Mother immigrant ==1 if mother is an immigrant, 0 otherwise
0.036 0.036 0.036
(0.187) (0.187) (0.186)
N 16404 8485 7919
The data is from the ESS survey and covers years from 2002 to 2013. The treatment group consists of individuals
born up to four years after the first cohort potentially affected by an education reform. The control group consists
of those born up to four years before the pivotal cohort. With the exception of France, the first potentially affected
cohort is not included, because the extent of their exposure to an education reform is unclear. The sample is
restricted to non-immigrants and citizens of the country of the interview who do not report being in school as
their main activity in the last 7 days. I do not report minimum and maximum values because all but two variables
are dummy variables; years of completed education (min. 0 and max. 25) and age (min. 29 and max. 65). Survey
weights are used.
Figure 2.1.
Austria. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
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Figure 2.2.
Belgium. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
Figure 2.3.
Denmark. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
Figure 2.4.
France. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
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Figure 2.5.
Greece. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
Figure 2.6.
Hungary. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
Figure 2.7.
Ireland. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
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Figure 2.8.
Italy. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
Figure 2.9.
Poland. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
Figure 2.10.
Portugal. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
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Figure 2.11.
Spain. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
Figure 2.12.
Sweden. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
Figure 2.13.
United Kingdom. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
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Figure 2.14.
Germany. Average Completed Years of Full-Time Education.
Table 2.2.B shows that the treatment group is younger by about 4 years, which is a consequence of the
empirical design.  In order to avoid potentially confounding effects of ageing on religiosity, I restrict the sample to
those 65 years old or younger.26 The mean age of 51 in the sample reflects the fact that the education reforms in the
analysis took place no later than 1983 and that some respondents are observed 20 to 30 years after the reform. The
youngest individuals in the sample are 29 years of age: they were born in 1973 (four years after the first cohort
potentially affected by the 1983 Belgium education reform) and interviewed in 2002. Only two percent belong to an
ethnic minority group and about four percent have mothers who were born outside the country.  The majority of the
sample (66 percent) are Christians, about 33 percent report having no religious denomination, and only 0.8% report
having a non-Christian religion.27  Forty-four percent of the respondents had working mothers when they were 14
years old. Because this rate is different between the treatment and control groups (46 percent and 40 percent,
respectively) I include the indicator for working mother in the regressions, although dropping this variable had no
impact on the results.
26 Lifting this restriction did not alter the results (see Appendix A, Table A.A.2).
27 For the 16,404 observations in Table 4, denomination information is available for 16,291 respondents. Finer
breakdown of the Christian population into specific denominations (Protestant, Catholic, etc.) was not possible due
to data limitations. Please, see Appendix C for details.
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2.6. Superstition Data
The questions on superstitious beliefs are asked in the European Values Study (EVS), which consists of
four waves of cross-sectional surveys conducted in various years from 1981 to 2008.  The question of “Do you
believe that a lucky charm, such as a mascot or a talisman, can protect or help you?” was asked in the 1999 and 2008
waves. All of the countries that are used in the analysis of religiosity based on the ESS survey are also in the sample
of lucky charm analysis.28
Possible answers to the question on lucky charm range from 1 (“Definitely not) to 10 (“Definitely yes”).
About 56 percent of all respondents indicated that they definitely do not believe in lucky charms (by choosing 1 on
the scale from 1 to 10), and about four percent chose 10, indicating that they definitely believed that lucky charm
protects them. Using this question, I created two dummy variables that measure whether the individual believes in
the protective power of a lucky charm.  The first variable takes the value of 1 if the person chose a value of 4 or
higher as his/her answer, and zero otherwise.  The second variable takes the value of 1 if the person chose 5 or
higher.  As Table 2.3.A shows, the means of these variables are slightly higher in the treatment group.
The 1999 wave of the EVS included two questions about horoscopes.  The question “How often do you
consult your horoscope to know about your future?” has five potential answers: “Every day,” “At least once a
week,” “At least once a month,” “Less often,” and “Never.”  The second question asks “How often do you take
horoscopes into account in your daily life?” Potential answers are: “Always,” “Most of the time,” “Sometimes,”
“Not very often,” and “Never.”  Because the horoscope questions were asked only in Austria, France, Greece, Italy,
and Germany, sample sizes are small (1,650 for the former question and 1,416 for the latter).  About 42 percent of
the respondents indicated that they never consult their horoscope and about 70 percent indicated that they never take
horoscope into account in daily life.  I created a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent
indicated that he/she consults horoscopes at least monthly.  Table 2.3.A shows that about 35 percent of the sample
28 The number of observations for Northern Ireland is very small for the ESS (57 observations in the main
regressions) because Northern Ireland is not treated by the ESS survey design as a separate country but as a region –
either a part of Great Britain (Rounds 1 to 6) or Ireland (Round 4 only). Using this information, I treated Northern
Ireland as a separate country. It has a separate country fixed effect in the regressions, but it is not presented in the
graphs, because the number of observations in Northern Ireland is small.  Omitting these observations or treating
them as a part of Great Britain does not alter the results. In the EVS data, however, Northern Ireland enters as a
separate country and has more observations (164 in the current sample).
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Table 2.3.A
Descriptive Statistics of Superstition Variables
Variable All Treatment Control
“Do you believe that a lucky charm, such as a mascot or a talisman, can protect or help you?”
(Question was asked in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and West Germany).
==1 if on a scale from 1 to 10 the individual’s belief in lucky charm is
4 or greater; 0 otherwise
0.279 0.285 0.273
(0.449) (0.452) (0.446)
==1 if on a scale from 1 to 10 the individual’s belief in lucky charm is
5 or greater; 0 otherwise
0.246 0.249 0.243
(0.431) (0.433) (0.429)
N 6969 3668 3301
“How often do you consult your horoscope to know about your future?”
(Question was asked in Austria, France, Greece, Italy and West Germany)
==1 if the individual consults her horoscope at least monthly
0.354 0.338 0.373
(0.479) (0.473) (0.484)
N 1650 886 764
“How often do you take horoscopes into account in your daily life?”
(Question was asked in Austria, France, Greece, Italy and West Germany)
==1 if individual takes into account horoscope in daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or always
0.147 0.140 0.156
(0.355) (0.347) (0.363)
N 1416 752 664
The data is from the EVS survey. The treatment group consists of individuals born up to seven years after the first
cohort potentially affected by an education reform. The control group consists of those born up to seven years
before the pivotal cohort. The first potentially affected cohort is not included, because the extent of their exposure
to an education reform is unclear. The sample is restricted to individuals between 25 and 65 years old, citizens of
the country of the interview, who do not report being a student. Survey weights are used.
does this, but that the rate is lower among the treatment group.29  Another dummy variable measures whether the
respondent takes into account his/her horoscope in daily life (sometimes, most of the time, or always.) About 15
percent of the sample behaves this way.
Table 2.3.B displays the personal attributes of the EVS respondents in the superstition samples.  The top
section of the table, pertaining to the lucky charm sample, contains a larger number of observations because it
involves more countries.
Table 2.3.B
Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables: EVS Sample
Variable Variable Definitions All Treatment Control
Lucky Charm Sample (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and West Germany).
Years of schooling Constructed number of years of full-timeeducation completed
11.971 12.356 11.540
(3.974) (3.834) (4.082)
29 It is possible that more educated individuals may feel embarrassed about their superstitious beliefs and they may
underreport the extent of their superstition.
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Table 2.3.B (Continued)
Variable Variable Definitions All Treatment Control
Lucky Charm Sample (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and West Germany).
Proportion of people who have completed the new compulsory level of
education or higher
0.735 0.794 0.669
(0.441) (0.404) (0.471)
Age Age of the respondent 47.487 44.373 50.977(8.440) (7.732) (7.811)
Male ==1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.500 0.498 0.503(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Working ==1 if the respondent is working, 0 otherwise 0.546 0.596 0.489(0.498) (0.491) (0.500)
Married ==1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.688 0.679 0.698(0.463) (0.467) (0.459)
Child at Home ==1 if a person under 18 lives at home, 0otherwise
0.542 0.639 0.433
(0.498) (0.480) (0.496)
City ==1 if the respondent lives in a town withpopulation bigger than 20,000, 0 otherwise
0.528 0.527 0.529
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
N 6969 3668 3301
Horoscope Sample (Austria, France, Greece, Italy and West Germany).
Years of schooling Constructed number of years of full-timeeducation completed
12.180 12.690 11.600
(4.189) (3.999) (4.325)
Proportion of people who have completed the new compulsory level of
education or higher
0.712 0.768 0.648
(0.453) (0.422) (0.478)
Age Age of the respondent 44.808 40.869 49.295(6.890) (5.749) (5.109)
Male ==1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.448 0.446 0.450(0.497) (0.497) (0.498)
Working ==1 if the respondent is working, 0 otherwise 0.564 0.596 0.528(0.496) (0.491) (0.500)
Married ==1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.710 0.690 0.733(0.454) (0.463) (0.443)
Child at Home ==1 if a person under 18 lives at home, 0otherwise
0.565 0.706 0.404
(0.496) (0.456) (0.491)
City ==1 if the respondent lives in a town withpopulation bigger than 20,000, 0 otherwise
0.637 0.641 0.634
(0.481) (0.480) (0.482)
N 1650 886 764
The data is from the EVS survey. The treatment and control groups consist of individuals born up to 7 years after
and up to 7 years before the pivotal cohort, respectively. The pivotal cohort is omitted, because the extent of their
exposure to an education reform is unclear. The sample is restricted to those between 25 and 65 years old, citizens
of the country of the interview, who do not report being a student. I do not report minimum and maximum values
because all but two variables are dummy variables: 1) years of completed education (min. 0 and max. 25 in the
lucky charm sample and min. 2 and max. 25 in the horoscope sample); 2) age (min. 25 and max. 65 in the lucky
charm sample and min. 28 and max. 63 in the horoscope sample). Survey weights are used.
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2.7. Results
2.7.1. The Impact of Education on Religiosity
  Estimating Equation (2.2) provides the average effect of an education reform, which is reported in Table 2.4.
Being exposed to a compulsory schooling reform increases educational attainment by about 0.4 years.30  This
estimate is close to that reported by Borgonovi et al. (2010), who also use ESS data and find the effect to be
approximately half a year.  Similarly, Gathmann et al. (2014) list the first stage coefficients for a number of
European countries and report the average estimate to be about 0.4.  Although my sample of countries is different
from those employed in these papers, the estimated impacts of the reform on educational attainment are similar.
Table 2.4
The Impact of Exposure to an Education Reform on Completed Years of Full-time Education: ESS Sample
(1)
Exposure to reform 0.410***
(0.122)
Age 0.304*
(0.165)
Age squared -0.000
(0.001)
Male 0.404***
(0.094)
Ethnic minority -0.157
(0.326)
City 1.311***
(0.123)
Mother immigrant 0.354*
(0.196)
Mother working 0.029
(0.079)
N 16404
The treatment group consists of individuals born up to 4 years after the first cohort potentially affected by an
education reform. The control group consists of those born up to 4 years before the pivotal cohort. With the
exception of France, the first potentially affected cohort is not included, because the extent of their exposure to an
education reform is unclear. Standard errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses. The estimation uses
sampling weights and includes survey year and survey country dummies. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
30 The effect of being exposed to an education reform is likely to be heterogeneous across countries. The change in
years of compulsory schooling, the timing of the reforms, the quality of their implementation, and political and
social circumstances differ from country to country.  Small sample sizes, however, prevent me from estimating the
first stage regressions for each country separately. However, I estimated the models by dividing the countries into
two sub-samples based on the dominant religion in the country.  The first group included countries where the
dominant religion is something other than Catholicism.  Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom are in
this group.  The rest of the sample constitutes Catholic countries.  The results remained the same in the Catholic
country sample, although the standard errors were inflated in the religiosity regressions. The sample size of the four
non-Catholic countries was small (ranging from 294 observations in horoscope regressions to 5,002 in religiosity
regressions); thus most of the coefficients other than religiosity were not estimated with precision.
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Table 2.5 presents the impact of education on religiosity, obtained from instrumental variable regressions.
In all specifications, the dummy for the exposure to an education reform serves as an instrument for completed years
of full-time education. The F-values for the instrument in first stage are around 11, and they are displayed, along
with their p-values, in the bottom rows of each panel.  Table 2.5 also reports the reduced form coefficients which
display the impact of the exposure to the reform on religiosity, on attending religious services and on praying.
The top panel of Table 2.5 reports the impact of education on attending religious services and on praying.
The standard errors of the estimated coefficients, clustered at the regional level are reported in parentheses.  The p-
values associated with the bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly
brackets}.  Column (1) shows that one additional year of full-time education reduces the propensity to attend
religious services at least once a month by about 13 percentage points. Similarly, column (2) shows that one year of
extra schooling decreases the propensity to attend religious services at least weekly by about 9 percentage points.
When I employ indicators of attending religious services very frequently (several times a week or every day) or very
infrequently (only on special holy days or less often) as dependent variables, the impact of education was close to
zero and statistically insignificant. This implies that schooling on the margin has an impact on religious practices if
the person is in the interior of the behavior space.
In columns (3) to (6) of the top panel of Table 2.5, the religiosity outcome is the reported frequency of
praying. The negative effect of additional education is about 9 percentage points when the dependent variable is the
propensity to pray at least once a month (column 3); and it is 10 to 12 percentage points when the outcomes is the
propensity to pray more than once a week (columns 4 and 5).  Column (6) shows that education has a negative but
statistically insignificant effect on praying every day.
Panel B of Table 2.5 displays the results where the outcome is religiosity.  Columns (1) to (3) present the
impact of education on individuals’ propensity for being above the cut-offs of 7, 8, and 9, respectively, on the scale
of religiosity from 0 “Not at all religious” to 10 “Very religious.”  Column (1) shows that an additional year of
schooling reduces the propensity of being religious (defined as being in categories of 8, 9 or 10) by about 8
percentage points. Column (2) of Panel B shows that an additional year of full-time education decreases the
likelihood of the individual being in the top two categories of religiosity by about 6 percentage points. The
coefficient in column (3) is also negative, but small and not different from zero indicating that education has no
statistically significant impact on self-declaration of being extremely religious.
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Table 2.5
The Impact of Education on Religiosity, IV Results
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services
(apart from special
occasions) …
Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a
month
...at least
once a week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
Years of schooling -0.130** -0.094** -0.087** -0.123** -0.096** -0.053
(0.057) (0.041) (0.041) (0.052) (0.048) (0.034)
{0.003}*** {0.028}** {0.067}* {0.015}** {0.032}** {0.204}
Reduced Form -0.052*** -0.037*** -0.035** -0.049*** -0.038** -0.021*
coefficient (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012)
{0.005}*** {0.034}** {0.082}* {0.017}** {0.033}** {0.191}
N 16337 16337 16163 16163 16163 16163
Sample Mean 0.313 0.188 0.460 0.400 0.330 0.223
1st Stage F-test 10.791 10.791 10.395 10.395 10.395 10.395
P-value 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in
the country
... is 8, 9, or
10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
Years of schooling -0.082** -0.061** -0.018 -0.058 -0.087** -0.072**
(0.039) (0.026) (0.015) (0.042) (0.042) (0.036)
{0.041}** {0.018}** {0.255} {0.186} {0.060}* {0.075}*
Reduced Form -0.034*** -0.025*** -0.007 -0.023 -0.036*** -0.030**
coefficient (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
{0.104} {0.013}** {0.292} {0.253} {0.081}* {0.166}
N 16323 16323 16323 16323 16323 16323
Sample Mean 0.188 0.084 0.042 0.382 0.259 0.157
1st Stage F-test 11.066 11.066 11.066 11.066 11.066 11.066
P-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
The treatment group consists of individuals born up to 4 years after the first cohort potentially affected by an
education reform. The control group consists of those born up to 4 years before the pivotal cohort. With the
exception of France, the first potentially affected cohort is not included, because the extent of their exposure to an
education reform is unclear. Control characteristics include Age, Age Squared, Male, Ethnic Minority, City,
Mother Immigrant and Mother Working variables. The estimations use sampling weights and include survey year
dummies, survey country dummies and country-specific cohort trends.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are
based on standard errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-
values based on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
Columns (4) to (6) in the Panel B of Table 2.5 display the results where the outcome variable is an indicator
for whether the individual belongs to the top 30 percent, 20 percent, or 10 percent of his/her country’s religiosity
distribution, respectively. The estimated coefficients are negative, ranging from -0.058 to -0.087, indicating that an
additional year of schooling reduces the probability of an individual being in the top 30, 20, or 10 percent of his/her
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country’s religiosity distribution. When the standard errors are estimated by clustering at the country/state level, the
inference does not change.
It must be noted that the estimated effects of education relate to a very specific group of people. In
particular, compulsory schooling reforms have induced some individuals to obtain additional years of education,
who would not have done so otherwise. Thus, I estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) of education for
these individuals, “compliers.” Therefore, I cannot generalize the estimated effects to the entire population.
Control variables, which are not reported in the interest of space, reveal that those individuals whose
mothers are immigrants are more likely to pray. Such individuals are also more likely to report higher levels of
religiosity. Males are significantly less likely than females to attend religious services, pray and declare themselves
religious. These gender differences in religiosity are consistent with those reported in other settings (Cesur and
Mocan 2013, Miller and Stark 2002, Walter and Davie 1998, Suziedelis and Potvin 1981).
Table 2.5 also shows that the significance of the reduced form coefficients is consistent with the IV
regressions for each model.  Thus, the results reported in Table 2.5 indicate that both the extent of religiosity and the
practice of religion are diminished by educational attainment.  This finding is in contrast to the conjecture of Glaeser
and Sacerdote (2008) who argued that the positive correlation between education and church attendance they found
in the U.S. data could be because attending religious services is more socially beneficial to the more educated. 31
The results, on the other hand, are consistent with recent research (Becker et al. 2014, Cesur and Mocan 2013,
Hungerman 2014).
2.7.2. The Impact of Education on Superstitious Beliefs
Table 2.6 presents the instrumental variables results where the outcome variables are whether the person
believes in the protective power of lucky charms (columns 1 and 2), whether the person consults horoscope at least
monthly (column 3) and whether he/she takes horoscope into account in daily life sometimes, most of the time, or
always (column 4). The models include country and survey year fixed effects, age and its quadratic, a gender
indicator, and an indicator for whether the respondent lives in a city, as well as country-specific cohort trends.
31 The difference in the results could be due to the source of data.  I analyze the behavior of people in 14 European
countries, whereas Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008) analyze data from the U.S.  It could be that the motivation for
attending religious services could be different in the U.S. from Europe.  The difference could also be attributable to
the fact that I instrument educational attainment, whereas the inference of Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008) was based
on OLS because of data limitations.
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The first row shows that the coefficients of education obtained from instrumental  variables regressions  are
always negative. They are statistically significant at the 5 percent level in columns (1) and (2), and significant at the
10-percent level in columns (3) and (4).32  The number of observations drops from about 16,500 in the religiosity
Table 2.6
The Impact of Education on Superstition, IV Results
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual consults
horoscope at least
monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of -0.111** -0.125** -0.124* -0.076*
Years of Schooling (0.054) (0.057) (0.074) (0.040)
{0.011}** {0.006}*** {0.075}* {0.007}***
1st stage coefficient 0.505*** 0.505*** 0.862** 1.186***
(0.161) (0.161) (0.351) (0.384)
Reduced form -0.056** -0.063*** -0.107** -0.090**
coefficient (0.022) (0.022) (0.041) (0.041)
{0.010}** {0.007}*** {0.087}* {0.003}***
N 6969 6969 1650 1416
Sample Mean 0.279 0.246 0.354 0.147
1st Stage F-test 9.859 9.859 6.041 9.535
P-value 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.003
The treatment group consists of individuals born up to 7 years after the first cohort potentially affected by an
education reform. The control group consists of those born up to 7 years before the pivotal cohort. With the
exception of France, the first potentially affected cohort is not included, because the extent of their exposure to an
education reform is unclear. Control characteristics include Age, Age Squared, Male, and City variables. The
lucky charm sample (columns (1) and (2)) includes respondents from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great
Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and West Germany.
The horoscope sample (columns (3) and (4)) includes respondents from Austria, Greece, France, Italy and West
Germany. Standard errors clustered at the country and year of birth level are reported in parenthesis. The
bootstrapped p-values based on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly
brackets}. The estimations use sampling weights and include survey year dummies, survey country dummies and
country-specific cohort trends.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on standard errors clustered at the
regional level, which are reported in parentheses.
regressions that used the ESS data (reported in Table 5) to about 7,000 in the lucky charm regressions and to 1,400-
1,650 in the horoscope regressions both of which use the EVS data.33
32 The bootstrapped standard errors, based on clustering at the country-level, indicate better levels of statistical
significance. Their p-values are reported in {curly brackets}.
33 Horoscope regressions only include Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and France, because the horoscope questions
were not asked in other countries with an available education reform instrument.
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The results of Table 2.6 indicate that an additional year of schooling reduces people’s belief that a lucky
charm protects them by 11 or 12 percentage points.34  One more year of schooling reduces the propensity to take
horoscopes into account in daily life by about 8 percentage points.   The reduced form coefficients of the education
reform, also reported in Table 2.6, indicate that exposure to the reform lowers the propensity to believe in lucky
charms by 5 to 6 percentage points, and it lowers the propensity to believe in horoscopes by 9 to 11 percentage
points.  These results, taken together, show that education reduces the propensity for believing in superstitious
phenomena.35,36
2.7.3. Robustness
To investigate the robustness of the results I estimated different versions of the main specifications.   For
example, I added a cubic term in age in addition to its quadratic specification, which did not alter the results.
Similarly, interacting age with country dummies did not change the results.  I also controlled for age by using seven
mutually exclusive age dummies.  The results followed the same pattern.
To investigate the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of people older than 65, I added to the sample
those who are 65 years of age and older, and re-estimated the models.  The results, which remained intact, are
reported in Appendix A, Table A.2.
The pivotal birth cohort years, shown as the vertical lines in the graphs, are excluded from the benchmark
models because it is difficult to determine the extent to which these cohorts are impacted by the reforms in their
respective countries (see the details of the reforms in Appendix B). One exception is France, where the pivotal
cohort is included in the treatment group.  This is because, as explained by Grenet (2013), in France everyone who
was born on or after January 1, 1953 has been affected by the reform of 1959. Thus, the entire 1953 cohort in France
is arguably impacted by the reform.  Nevertheless, I re-estimated the models by dropping this pivotal cohort of
34 When I estimate the lucky charm model, defining superstition as belonging to categories of 6 and higher (on the
scale from 1 to 10) regarding the belief in the power of lucky charms, I find that only 17 percent of the sample
possesses this level of superstition and the estimated IV coefficient is -0.034, not statistically significant at
conventional levels.
35 When I estimate the religiosity and superstition regressions reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 using OLS instead of
IV, I find that the estimated coefficients of education are very small, and most of the estimated coefficients are
statistically insignificant when standard errors are clustered at the state/country level and bootstrapped.  These OLS
results are summarized in Appendix A, Table A.1.
36 If I use the treatment intensity (number of additional years of education due to reform) as an instrument instead of
exposure to the reform, I find that the first stage coefficients become smaller in magnitude, but their statistical
significance remains. The estimated IV coefficients for religiosity outcomes are smaller and in most cases they lose
their significance. The IV coefficients for superstition also become smaller in magnitude, but remain significant.
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France from the sample. The results, displayed in Appendix A, Table A.3, are not impacted by this omission.   I also
considered the pivotal cohorts in all countries as part of the treated cohorts.  In this case, the cohorts for which the
exposure to the reforms was unclear (the cohorts marked with vertical lines in the Figures) are added to the
treatment groups.  This exercise did not change the results appreciably, although the standard errors became larger in
some cases.  These results are displayed in Appendix A, Table A.4.
Brunello, Fabbri and Fort (2013) use nine of the countries in my sample to investigate the impact of
education on body mass index using the reforms as an instrument for education.  Because  there are differences
between Brunello et al. (2013) dates and my dates regarding the pivotal cohorts, I re-estimated the models using the
dates listed in Table 1 of Brunello et al. (2013).37  The results are not impacted with the exception of the standard
errors in the superstition regressions, which became larger.   I also ran the models by treating the states of Germany
as separate countries.  Once again, the results are not impacted appreciably.  These results are shown in Appendix A,
Tables A.5 and A.6, respectively.
The benchmark models control for country-specific cohort trends.  As alternative specification I ran models
with quadratic age trends as was done in Brunello et al. (2013) and obtained similar results (Appendix A, Table
A.7).38
As another sensitivity analysis, I expanded the control and treatment groups to include people born up to 7
years before and after the pivotal cohort, respectively. These results are provided in Appendix A, Table A.8.  One
again, they are consistent with those obtained from the benchmark specification.
Finally, I analyzed the extent to which the results change when I turn the control variables on-off.  I
excluded each control variable one by one and re-estimated the models.  Additionally, I estimated the models with
no controls. These changes did not alter the impact of education demonstrably.
2.7.4. Ordered Probit Models for Religiosity and Superstition
As an alternative specification, I estimated the religiosity and superstition models using ordered probit
specifications while accounting for endogeneity of education.  For each outcome, each person is classified into one
37 See Appendix B for the description of the reforms and implementation dates.
38 In the spirit of Brunello (2013), in this specification I also included dummies for 5-year intervals for the year of
birth.
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of the three categories based on their location on the relevant scale of religiosity or superstition.  These categories
are displayed in rows I and II of Table 2.7.  The ordered probit specification is described by Equations (2.3)-(2.5):
R୧୩ୡ୲∗ = δEducation + X୧୩ୡ୲ᇱ Ω + μୡ + η୲ + u୧୩ୡ୲,       (2.3)
where R୧୩ୡ୲∗  is the unobserved latent religiosity or superstition variable and R୧୩ୡ୲ is the observed outcome measure:R୧୩ୡ୲ = 1 if R୧୩ୡ୲∗ ≤ αଵ, R୧୩ୡ୲ = 2 if αଵ < R୧୩ୡ୲∗ ≤ αଶ, and R୧୩ୡ୲ = 3 if R୧୩ୡ୲∗ > αଶ, αଵ and αଶ are unknown cut-offs to
be estimated. u୧୩ୡ୲ is assumed to be standard normal. μୡ and η୲ stand for country and year of survey fixed effects,
respectively. The specification also includes country-specific quadratic age trends and dummies for 5-year intervals
for the year of birth. The probabilities of being in each of the three categories of religiosity or superstition-related
behavior are given by:
Pr(R୧୩ୡ୲ = 1) = Φ(αଵ − δEducation୧୩ୡ୲ − X୧୩ୡ୲ᇱ Ω − μୡ − η୲)
Pr(R୧୩ୡ୲ = 2) = Φ(αଶ − δEducation୧୩ୡ୲ − X୧୩ୡ୲ᇱ Ω − μୡ − η୲)
−Φ(αଵ − δEducation୧୩ୡ୲ − X୧୩ୡ୲ᇱ Ω − μୡ − η୲)
Pr(R୧୩ୡ୲ = 3) = 1 − Φ(αଶ − δEducation୧୩ୡ୲ − X୧୩ୡ୲ᇱ Ω − μୡ − η୲)       (2.4)
Education is modeled as follows:
Education = γ଴ + γଵReform୩ୡ + X୧୩ୡ୲ᇱ Ω + μୡ + η୲ + v୧୩ୡ୲,       (2.5)
where it is assumed that (u୧୩ୡ୲ , v୧୩ୡ୲) is jointly normally distributed: (u୧୩ୡ୲ , v୧୩ୡ୲) ∼ N(0, Σ), and is independent of
the instrument Reform୩ୡ.
The ordered probit is estimated by conditional maximum likelihood by specifying the joint distribution for
the relevant outcome variable and education, given the exogenous variables X୧୩ୡ୲ᇱ  and the instrument Reform୩ୡ.39
The marginal effects of education are calculated at mean values of regressors, and standard errors are computed by
the delta method.
39  Estimation is carried out using the cmp Stata command described in Roodman (2011). The command is built on
the Stata maximum likelihood estimation framework, and allows for the use of weights and clustering of standard
errors.
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Table 2.7
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition, Ordered Probit with Endogenous Education
Panel A: Religiosity
“How often do you attend
religious services?” from 1
“Every day” to 7 “Never”
“How often do you pray?” from
1 “Every day” to 7 “Never”
“How religious are you?”
from 0 “Not at all religious”
to 10 “Very religious”
(I)
Category 1 (30.4%): never
Category 2 (38.3%): only on
special holy days or less
often
Category 3 (31.3%): at least
once a month
Category 1 (33.3%): never
Category 2 (26.7%): more often
than never but less often than
weekly
Category 3 (40.0%): at least
once a week
Category 1 (31.2%): 0 to 3
Category 2 (50.0%): 4 to 7
Category 3 (18.8%): 8 to 10
Ordered Probit -0.191*** -0.197*** -0.201***
coefficient (0.047) (0.046) (0.048)
Category 1 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.075***
Marginal effect (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Category 2 0.004** 0.004*** -0.013***
Marginal effect (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Category 3 -0.071*** -0.077*** -0.061***
Marginal effect (0.020) (0.019) (0.022)
N 16337 16163 16323
Panel B: Superstition
“Do you believe lucky
charms protect?” from 1
“Definitely not” to 10
“Definitely yes”
“How often do you consult your
horoscope?” from 1 “Every day”
to 5 “Never”
“How often do you take
horoscope into account in
daily life?” “Always” to 5
“Never”
(II)
Category 1 (65.4%): 1 and 2
Category 2 (25.1%): 3 to 7
Category 3 (9.4%): 8 to 10
Category 1 (64.6%): never or less
often than once a month Category
2 (10.4%): at least once a month
Category 3 (25.1%): at least once
a week or every day
Category 1 (69.5%):
never Category 2
(15.7%): not very often
Category 3 (14.7%):
sometimes, most of the
time or always
Ordered Probit -0.129* -0.145 -0.176***
coefficient (0.077) (0.120) (0.058)
Category 1 0.048* 0.058 0.062**
Marginal effect (0.029) (0.048) (0.027)
Category 2 -0.025** -0.004 -0.018***
Marginal effect (0.011) (0.003) (0.002)
Category 3 -0.023 -0.054 -0.044
Marginal effect (0.018) (0.049) (0.028)
N 6969 1650 1416
Please see text for the specification details. In Panel A, the treatment and control groups consist of those born up
to four years after and before the pivotal cohort, respectively. In Panel B, the treatment and control groups consist
of those born up to seven years after and before the pivotal cohort, respectively. In both panels, with the exception
of France, the first potentially affected cohort is not included, because the extent of their exposure to an education
reform is unclear.  In Panel A, standard errors in parentheses are clustered at regional level. In Panel B, standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at country and year of birth level.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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In all cases, we classified answers into three categories.  Panel A of Table 2.7 displays the results pertaining
to the religiosity models.  Column (1) reports the ordered probit results where the dependent variable consists of
three categories of the frequency of attending religious services: The individual is in Category 1 if she/he never
attends religious services.  Category 2 identifies attendance only on special or holy days or even less often.
Category 3 designates more frequent attendance: at least once a month.  As shown in column (1), the proportion of
people in each category is about the same.   The estimated ordered probit coefficient is reported in column (1) along
with the marginal effects for each category.   The results show that a one-year increase in education, induced by the
mandate, increases the probability of never attending religious services.  It also increases the probability of attending
very infrequently, while decreasing the probability of attending religious services at least once a month.
Column (2) of Panel A in Table 2.7 shows that a one-year increase in education makes people less likely to
pray at least once a week, and makes them more likely to never pray or pray infrequently.   Column (3) of Panel A
demonstrates that one additional year of education reduces the probability that the individual indicates he/she is very
religious (being in Category 3) by 6.1 percentage points.  Similarly, an extra year of education reduces the
probability of being in the second religiosity category by 1.3 percentage points.  The probability of being not
religious (Category 1) goes up by about 7.5 percentage points due to the same increase in education.
Panel B of Table 2.7 presents the instrumental-variable ordered probit results for superstition outcomes.
Column (1) shows that one year of extra education decreases individuals’ propensity to believe in the protective
power of lucky charms as it moves them from Categories 2 and 3 to Category 1.  Column (2) of Panel B in Table 2.7
presents the results pertaining to consulting horoscopes about the future.  An increase in education reduces the
frequency with which people refer to horoscopes, but the estimated coefficients are insignificant. The results
reported in column (3) of Table 2.7 show that an additional year of education makes people more likely to indicate
that they never take horoscopes into account in their daily lives.40 Correspondingly, an additional year of education
makes people less likely to reveal that they belong to Categories 2 or 3, which are associated with taking horoscopes
into account in daily affairs at least sometimes.
40 Dummies for 5-year intervals for the year of birth had to be omitted from this estimation in order for the cmp
command to achieve conversion.
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2.7.5. Placebo Treatment
In this final analysis of the chapter, I implement placebo tests for the treatment.  Specifically, I move the
reform dates in each country two or three years forward or two or three year backward in comparison to the actual
reform dates, and re-estimate the models. If the results reported so far are spurious and if the impact of the reform on
education, religiosity and superstition is coincidental (e.g. because it merely captures the impact of a general move
towards secularity), then moving the reform dates should still have an impact on religious and superstitious beliefs.
The results are reported in Appendix A, Tables A.9 to A.12.  Between the instrumental variables and the reduced
models, 128 coefficients are estimated, and only eight of them are different from zero, and in all cases the first-stage
regressions are meaningless.  These results indicate that the actual dates of the reforms determine the variation of
education among individuals, which in turn impacts their religious and superstitious beliefs.
2.8. Summary and Conclusion
Although it has been argued that adherence to religion and superstition would diminish as level of
education rises, it is a challenging task to find exogenous variation in education between individuals that can be used
to identify the extent to which education impacts their superstitious and religious beliefs.
In this chapter, I exploit compulsory schooling reforms implemented in European countries during the
1960s and 70s.  These schooling laws increased the mandatory years of education by one or more years, depending
on the country.  Based on their year of birth, some individuals were exposed to these education reforms and were
therefore mandated to receive additional years of schooling.  Other individuals in the same country were exempt
from the mandate because they were born before the cut-off date of the law, and therefore the law was not binding
for them.
I use data from the European Social Survey and consider the treatment by the compulsory schooling laws
implemented by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom as exogenous instruments that impact individuals’ actual attained education
and show that these education reforms increased average education by 0.4 years.  Using questions on religiosity and
the frequency of attending religious services and running instrumental variables regressions, I find that an additional
year of education, triggered by the mandate, has a significant negative impact on both measures of religiosity.  I also
find that education has a negative impact on the frequency of praying.  The results indicate that education not only
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reduces the extent of religiosity, it also lowers the propensity for participation in social religious activities (i.e.
attending religious services), as well as the propensity to engage in private religious activities (i.e. praying).
Using data from the European Values Study, I apply the same empirical procedure and investigate the
extent to which education impacts superstitious beliefs.  I find that education reduces the propensity to believe in the
power of lucky charms (such as mascots or talismans).  Education also reduces the frequency with which people
consult horoscopes to learn about the future, and the extent to which people take into account horoscopes in their
daily lives.
A variety of specification alternatives and falsification tests reveal the robustness of the findings, showing
that education reduces the tendency to be religious and superstitious.
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CHAPTER 3. THE IMPACT OF TAX RATES AND CULTURE OF LEISURE ON LABOR SUPPLY IN
EUROPE
3.1. Introduction
There are substantial differences between people around the world regarding how many hours they work in
the labor market.  For example, in 2012, the average annual hours worked by American workers was 1,789.  The
average worker in Germany worked 22 percent fewer hours than an American worker in that year, and a French
worker worked 17 percent less. A worker in Belgium spent about 12 percent less time at work in comparison to an
American worker. Similar disparities are observed when hours per person is analyzed, instead of hours per worker.41
Annual hours worked per working age population (ages 15 to 64) are 10 percent lower in Germany, 19 percent
lower in France, and 17 percent lower in Belgium in comparison to the U.S.
 In an influential paper, Edward Prescott (2004) employed a growth model with a representative household
and calibrated the model to show that the difference in hours worked between the United States and Europe at two
points in time can be explained almost entirely by the differences in the tax rates on labor and consumption.  A large
literature that followed provided a number of nuanced extensions and modifications to Prescott’s framework,
regarding the preferred labor supply elasticities to calibrate such macro models, modifications to the model to
incorporate the ability for the household to self-insure through asset accumulation, the role of productivity growth,
and so on (e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent 2006, Ohanian et al. 2008, Rogerson 2008, Olovsson 2009, Chetty et al.
2011, McDaniel 2011).  In a different framework, Algan and Cahuc (2005) showed that family labor supply
attitudes were important in explaining the variation in the employment rates of different demographic groups in
OECD countries.
The finding that taxes are a major factor in explaining cross-country differences in market work is
important because it implies that reductions in taxes can generate significant increases in economic activity.
Alternative, or at least complementary, hypotheses have been proposed to explain the differences in hours worked
between Europe and the U.S.   These include the importance of regulations and labor unions (Alesina, Glaeser and
Sacerdote 2006), and the role of home production (Olovsson 2015).   An important aspect of this discussion is the
role of preferences for leisure.  The assumption of identical preferences between countries, and in particular between
Europeans and Americans has been questioned (Blanchard 2006). This point is also emphasized by Alesina, Glaeser
41 This measure incorporates both the willingness to participate in the labor market (the decision on whether or not
to work) and the decision on how many hours to work.
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and Sacerdote (2006) who suggested that an initial decline in market work might increase individuals’ utility from
leisure and this process can be amplified by a social multiplier (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 2003) if there
exist complementarities in leisure – individuals’ utility from leisure is enhanced when more people are consuming
leisure.
The argument that Europeans have stronger taste for leisure than Americans (Blanchard 2004) is perhaps
intuitive, and fits well with many people’s pre-conceived image of longer vacations and shorter work weeks in most
European countries.  Although tastes for leisure can impact labor supply, no systematic analysis has been conducted
on this subject.42  In this chapter, I focus on European countries and investigate the impact of taxes and the culture of
leisure on labor supply.  Using a large micro data set consisting of individuals from 26 European countries, I analyze
people’s labor supply decisions both at the extensive and the intensive margins.43  While there are significant
differences between Americans and Europeans in hours worked, there are also substantial differences in market
work between European countries.  To demonstrate the extent of variation between countries in hours worked, I use
OECD data and calculated hours worked per population ages 15 to 64 in 2012, in a sample of European countries,
which are displayed in Table 3.1.  This measure contains two dimensions of market work: the fraction of the
working age population that actually works and the number of hours of those who work.  The entries in Table 3.1
are standardized to portray average hours worked in each country relative to the U.K.  For example, hours worked
per person in France, Germany and Greece are 19 percent, 10 percent, and 3 percent lower, respectively, than in the
42 Standard empirical models of labor supply include a vector of worker attributes such as racial and ethnic
background, if available, in an effort to control for pre-market factors that can impact labor supply, but explicit
adjustment to taste for leisure has not been done so far.
43 The conjecture is that some countries have stronger preferences for leisure, and people in those countries would
have worked fewer hours even if they faced lower marginal tax rates.  On the face of it, this argument does not seem
to explain the increasing wedge between labor supply of Americans and Europeans over the last three decades or so,
because culture is not expected to change rapidly. Even though the goal of this chapter is not to explain the
divergence of hours worked between countries over time, I would still like to emphasize that cultural attributes are
malleable, and they change in reaction to external factors. For example, Fernández (2013) shows that social attitudes
towards women’s work endogenously change over time. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) find that individual
preferences are shaped by the political regime in which the individual lives.  Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) show
that individuals’ political preferences and support for government redistribution are impacted by whether or not they
grew up during recessionary periods. Giavazzi, Petkov and Schiantarelli (2014) show that while some cultural
values evolve slowly, others change rapidly. Cannonier and Mocan (2012) find that women in Sierra Leone whose
education is improved by an education reform are more likely to disapprove of the cultural practice of female genital
mutilation.  Mocan (2013) finds that the intensity of vengeful feelings depends on the economic environment of the
individual.
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Table 3.1
Hours Worked Per Capita (ages 15-64) in Selected OECD Countries in 2012
Country Hours Worked per Working Age Person(Indexed to UK=100)
Portugal 105
Sweden 104
Austria 104
United Kingdom 100
Greece 97
Netherlands 96
Italy 95
Denmark 93
Germany 90
Belgium 84
Spain 84
France 81
Turkey 74
Source: OECD Labor Database and OECD Productivity Database.
U.K. Swedes work 4 percent more than the working age population in the U.K.  Importantly, as I will show later in
the chapter, there is also substantial variation in the effective marginal tax rates between European countries.
The critical issue for the purposes of this chapter is how to measure the “taste for leisure,” and how to
identify its impact on market work.  I focus on second-generation immigrants who reside in various European
countries.  These individuals are born in Europe, and, being residents of different European countries, have been
exposed to institutional, legal and labor market structures of their countries, including the marginal tax rates on labor
and consumption income.  Their fathers had migrated from somewhere else in the world, and I know these fathers’
countries of origin.  I use immigrant fathers’ countries of birth to determine the ancestral roots and assume that
culture of leisure in fathers’ countries of origin is transmitted from the immigrant fathers to the offspring. I focus on
fathers, rather than mothers because most of the literature uses the birthplace of the father to assign country of origin
to second-generation immigrants (Alesina et al. 2015, Alesina and Giuliano 2011, Alesina and Giuliano 2010,
Fernández and Fogli 2009, Card et al. 1998).  By exploiting a separate data set that asks people around the world
various questions to gauge their taste for leisure, I connect these second-generation immigrants in Europe to the
culture of leisure in their father’s country of origin.
I analyze the labor supply of second-generation immigrants who are born in the countries to which their
fathers have migrated.  It is conceivable that fathers’ migration decisions were motivated by the tax rates in the
countries of destination.  For example, people from those countries where leisure is valued highly could have chosen
to migrate to destination countries which have high tax rates.  If this is the case, such self-selection of migrants as a
function of destination country tax rates could confound the estimated impact of taxes on the labor supply of the
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second-generation.  To investigate this possibility I divided the analysis sample into two groups: the countries with
above-median tax rates, and the countries with below-median tax rates.  I show that the observed characteristics of
the second-generation immigrants and the characteristics of their immigrant fathers are balanced between these two
groups of destination countries.  Furthermore, the indicators of “taste for leisure” in the countries of origin are
balanced as well, minimizing the concern of first-generation’s (fathers’) self-selection based on the tax rates.
I have data from about 7,000 individuals who live and work in 26 European countries.  These individuals
have ancestral origins in 47 different countries.44  Thus, I am able to identify the impact of taxes in the country of
residence on hours worked, holding constant observable attributes of individuals, various attributes of the country in
which they live, and attributes of their father’s country of origin, including the taste for leisure in that country of
origin.  Similarly, I can identify the impact of culture of leisure on labor supply, holding constant all personal
attributes and various characteristics of the country of residence, including the tax rates.  To eliminate, to the extent
possible, the factors that may impact the labor market activity of the individuals stemming from the demand side and
institutional structure, I control for such variables as the unemployment rate, per capita income, legal origin,
religious make-up, as well as the size of the population and average education of the country of destination. A
similar set of covariates are included for the country of origin.  These variables are described in the data section
below.
I find that both taxes and culture of leisure impact labor force participation and hours worked for women.
For men, taxes influence labor supply both at the intensive and the extensive margin, but culture of leisure has no
impact.  The magnitude of the estimated effects indicates that while taxes on labor income are a significant
determinant of aggregate hours worked, culture of leisure is important as well.
This chapter is also related to a growing new literature that investigates the interplay between culture and
economic outcomes.  Some recent examples include Fernández and Fogli (2009) who investigate the impact of
female labor force participation and fertility rates in the country of origin on work and fertility decisions of second-
generation American women. Alesina and Giuliano (2011) who investigate the impact of family ties on political
participation, labor force participation and trust.  Luttmer and Singhal (2011) report that immigrants’ redistributive
preferences are impacted by the average preference in their country of birth.  Ljunge (2014) analyzes the
44 I have dropped individuals if their countries of origin had contributed fewer than 10 observations to the sample.
Including these individuals had no impact on the results.
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transmission of trust to immigrant children.  Alesina et al. (2015) find that people who inherit strong family ties are
less mobile and have lower wages and higher unemployment.  A detailed description of this literature can be found
in Alesina and Giuliano (2014) and Fernández (2011).
3.2. Theoretical Framework
To motivate the empirical model, I follow the framework of Prescott (2004) and consider a representative
agent who is endowed with one unit of time that can be divided between labor and leisure.  Preferences over
consumption and leisure are represented by the utility function in Equation (3.1):U = ∑ β୲(log c୲ + γlog  (1 − h୲))ஶ୲ୀ଴ ,       (3.1)
where c୲ stands for consumption and h୲ represents hours worked; implying that (1 − h୲) is the amount of leisure.
The discount factor β represents the degree of patience, where 0 < β < 1.  The parameter γ is the value attached to
leisure.  The aggregate production function of the economy is Cobb-Douglas, with an output elasticity of capital θ,
and elasticity of labor (1 − θ).  The production function converts labor (h୲ in Equation (3.1)) and capital into output,
which can be consumed or invested.
The budget constraint of the representative agent is:(1 + τୡ)c୲ + (1 + τ୶)x୲ = (1 − τ୦)w୲h୲ + (1 − τ୩)r୲k୲ + T୲,       (3.2)
where τୡ is the consumption tax rate, x୲ stands for investment, τ୶ is the tax rate on investment, and τ୦ is the
marginal labor tax rate; r୲ stands for the rental price of capital and τ୩ is the capital income tax rate. T୲ represents
government transfers at time t that are financed by taxes. w୲ is the price of labor, therefore w୲h୲ represents labor
income.
The standard first-order conditions indicate that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption is equal to the ratio of their prices, and that labor is paid its marginal product.  The first-order
conditions imply:h୲ = (1 − θ)/ ቄ1 − θ + ୡ౪୷౪ ஓ(ଵିத)ቅ,       (3.3)
where τ = (τ୦ + τୡ)/(1 + τୡ), which is the effective marginal tax rate on labor income.  It represents the
combined labor and consumption taxes exerted on labor income, holding investment constant.  Equation (3.3)
depicts the supply of hours worked.  Because the effective marginal tax rate on labor income, τ, is embedded in one
of the first-order conditions, it is also in Equation (3):  an increase in the tax rate τ reduces labor supply h୲.
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Much attention has been devoted to the investigation of the impact of taxes on hours worked at a cross-
section of countries, or by using the variation in the tax rates of countries over a period of time.  On the other hand,
the impact of marginal utility of leisure on hours worked (which is depicted by γ in Equation (3.3)), has not been
investigated, despite the fact that it has been postulated to be a potentially important factor to explain cross-country
differences in labor supply.  An increase in γ has a negative impact on hours worked.  As I describe in the next
section, I develop measures of γ to represent the value of leisure that can vary between countries.
Equation (3.3) provides a framework in which labor supply depends on taxes and tastes for leisure.  I will
not estimate the specific structural parameters, based on the specific form depicted by Equation (3.3).  Rather, as
shown below, I will estimate a linear formulation of labor supply, which depends on personal attributes of
individuals, country characteristics including taxes, and measures of taste for leisure.
Although I use survey data on individuals from various years, there is no substantial variation in marginal
taxes over the years in a country.  Thus, the elasticity estimates can be interpreted as steady-state elasticities.  I
estimate elasticities both at the extensive and intensive margins.
3.3. Empirical Implementation
Consistent with the theoretical framework described in the previous section, I estimate the following
specification to investigate the impact of taxes and taste for leisure on labor supply:h୧୨୬୲ =  β଴ +  βଵτ୨ + βଶL୬ + X୧Φ + C୨Ω + CO୬Ψ +  δ୲ + ε୧୨୬୲,       (3.4)
where h୧୨୬୲ stands for the labor supply of person i who is a second-generation immigrant, living in country j,
surveyed at time t.  Labor supply is measured both at the extensive and intensive margins, allowing me to estimate
models for labor force participation and for hours worked, conditional on participation.  The subscript n represents
the country-of-origin of this person’s father (who migrated from country n to country j).  The vector X୧ includes
personal attributes of individual i that may impact his/her labor supply decision such as age, completed years of
education, marital status, and the size of the city of residence.  Because ethnic minorities may face labor market
discrimination which may alter their labor supply, I also control for whether the person perceives him/herself as an
ethnic minority in that country.
The variable τ measures the effective marginal tax rate on labor income in country j where person i resides
and works.  I follow the literature closely, and as detailed in the next section, use country-specific tax rates
43
generated by the previous research (Prescott 2004, McDaniel 2011).   Although I use surveys of individuals from
different years, the two measures of taxes I employ (the effective marginal tax rate, as well as the average tax rate
for a single person without a dependent) do not change appreciably within a country in the sample period.  Thus, the
impact of taxes on labor supply is identified mainly from cross-country variation in tax rates.L୬ stands for various measures of the culture of leisure in the country of origin, constructed by using data
from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study. For example, one particular question in these
surveys is: “How important is leisure in your life?” Possible answers range from 1 “Not important” to 4 “Very
important.”  The average value of answers to this question was 3.5 in Sweden, 3.3 in Uruguay, 2.9 in Morocco, and
2.6 in China, suggesting that people in Sweden value leisure more strongly in comparison to those who live in
Morocco or in China, for example. Other examples of indicators for culture of leisure are responses to such
statements as “People who don’t work turn lazy” (agree-disagree on a scale from 1 to 5) and “Work is a duty to
society” (agree-disagree from 1 to 5).  The details of these and other measures of culture of leisure in the country of
origin are explained in the data section.
The framework shown in Equation (3.4) is termed an “epidemiological” approach by Fernández (2008,
2007) because it aims to identify the impact of inherited, pre-existing factors on behavior, holding constant the
context in which the decision takes place.  Note that reverse causality from labor supply to “taste for leisure” is
unlikely to be an issue here because the labor supply decision of the individual cannot have an impact on the extent
of the taste for leisure in father’s country of origin.  Similarly, an individual’s labor supply is not expected to have
an immediate impact on the tax rate in her country of residence.  Even if the government wanted to react to a
variation in aggregate hours worked in the economy by altering the tax rates, it cannot do so quickly, because it is
well known that the inside-lags are substantial in case of fiscal policy.  In other words, changes in taxes necessitate
negotiations both in the legislature and with different constituents including labor unions.  Because of the lags in
legislative implementation, it is implausible that tax rates would react contemporaneously to a change in the
aggregate hours worked in the economy.
Neither the tax rates nor aggregate labor supply vary significantly within a country from year to year.  For
example, in Germany average hours worked per working-age population were 1,066 in 2008, 1,057 in 2010, and
1,067 in 2012.  I display the aggregate hours worked and the effective marginal tax rate for France, Germany, the
U.K. and Belgium from the OECD data over the period of 2000-2012 in Table 3.2.  There is no systematic change in
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Table 3.2
Average Hours Worked and the Effective Marginal Tax Rate in Selected European Countries 2000-2012
France Germany United Kingdom Belgium
Year
Hours
worked
per
working
age
population
Effective
marginal
tax rate
Hours
worked
per
working
age
population
Effective
marginal
tax rate
Hours
worked
per
working
age
population
Effective
marginal
tax rate
Hours
worked
per
working
age
population
Effective
marginal
tax rate
2000 995 55.5 1,045 52.7 1,217 44.1 976 58.0
2001 997 54.8 1,037 52.4 1,218 44.2 982 57.8
2002 969 54.3 1,026 52.3 1,208 43.2 972 58.6
2003 960 54.6 1,014 52.6 1,203 42.9 965 58.0
2004 972 54.7 1,021 51.5 1,191 43.3 967 58.2
2005 968 55.2 1,007 51.4 1,204 43.6 970 57.6
2006 956 55.2 1,029 51.7 1,200 43.6 977 56.6
2007 974 54.7 1,053 52.3 1,198 43.9 986 56.3
2008 979 54.7 1,066 52.6 1,190 43.8 991 56.4
2009 953 54.8 1,038 52.6 1,156 42.9 971 56.2
2010 954 54.4 1,057 51.3 1,154 43.2 974 56.5
2011 962 55.6 1,071 51.4 1,157 43.9 988 56.9
2012 960 56.9 1,067 52.1 1,182 43.3 989 57.7
Source: Hours worked per working age population are constructed using data from the OECD Labor Database
and the OECD Productivity Database. τ  is the effective marginal tax rate on labor income (Prescott 2004). The
calculation of τ follows the formulation of Prescott (2004) and McDaniel (2011):
τ = த౩౩ାଵ.଺∗த౟౤ౙାதౙ
ଵାதౙ
, where τୱୱ, τ୧୬ୡ, and τୡ are taken from McDaniel (2014) data.
hours worked or in the tax rate in these countries over the course of these 13 years.  When I calculate the year-to-
year change in average hours worked and in the effective marginal tax rate over the same period for the 26 European
countries used in the analysis, I find that the average annual growth rate is essentially zero for both hours worked
and taxes (the average growth rate is -0.002  in case of annual hours and -0.003 in case of taxes).
It is conceivable that culture of leisure might differ systematically between countries due to income
differences.  Put differently, to the extent that leisure is a normal good, it would be valued differently as the average
income level of the country goes up. To account for this effect, I control for per capita income in the country of
origin (as part of the vector CO୬).  Note, however, that most of the questions that aim to measure culture of leisure
do not target the inter-temporal aspect of work-leisure tradeoff.  Specifically, the answers to questions such as “Do
you think people who don’t work turn lazy?” and “Do you think work is a duty to society?” should be largely
independent of cyclical variations in economic conditions faced by the respondents.  Rather, the answers to these
questions should, arguably, reflect beliefs that are rather stable.  The vector CO୬ contains a number of other
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attributes of the country of ancestry, such as the index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation, legal origin indicators, a
measure of democracy, and measures of the religious make-up of the country of origin.
The vector C୨ controls for the attributes of the country of residence that may influence labor supply through
their impact on aggregate labor productivity, institutional factors and so on.  It is also possible that both country-
level taxes and individual labor supply are driven by certain socio-economic and cultural attributes of the country.
For example, societies can be rated on a scale ranging from “individualistic” to “collectivist” using the index of
individualism, developed by Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede (2005).  Lower values indicate the higher extent of
collectivism of the society, which stands for the extent to which individuals are integrated into groups.  In
collectivist societies, people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended
families (with uncles, aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning
loyalty.  Higher values of the index represent individualistic societies where the ties between individuals are loose,
and where people are expected to look after themselves and their immediate family.45  There is substantial variation
around the world in the extent to which countries are individualistic or collectivist.  For example, Australia is rated a
highly individualistic country with a score of 90 (out of 100), and the most collectivist societies are Colombia with a
score of 13, Indonesia with a score of 14 and Costa Rica with a score of 15.  It could be the case that the extent of
individualism in the country may be correlated with the peoples’ desired level of government regulation and tax
rates, as well as with the extent of the labor supply.  I control for individualism in the country to account for such an
effect.
Additionally, the vector C୨ contains other variables that potentially impact both taxes and labor supply
including per capita GDP in the country of residence, average educational attainment in the country, the index of
ethno-linguistic fragmentation, size of the population, legal origin indicators, and number of years in which country
experienced democracy between 1930 and 1995.  I control for the unemployment rate as an indicator of the labor
market conditions in the survey year because the tightness of the labor market would impact the labor supply
decision of the individual.  I control for the religious composition of the country because it may be a cultural
determinant of labor supply.  I also control for the legal origin of the country.  These indicators account for whether
45 These descriptions are obtained from (http://www.geert-hofstede.com/geert_hofstede_ resources.shtml).
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the country’s legal origin is British common law, French commercial code, socialist or communist law, German
commercial law or Scandinavian commercial law.
Time fixed-effects δ୲ account for the year in which individuals are surveyed. Standard errors are clustered
at the country of origin.
Alternative versions of Equation (3.4) are estimated as shown below.
h୧୨୬୲ =  α଴ + αଵτ୨ + X୧Θ + C୨Ξ +  ξ୲ + μ୬ + ν୧୨୬୲       (3.5)
h୧୨୬୲ =  λ଴ + λଵL୬ +  X୧Λ + CO୬Γ + θ୲ + ω୨ + u୧୨୬୲       (3.6)
In Equation (3.5), I replace all country-of-origin variables by country-of-origin fixed-effects (μ୬).  This
specification does not contain measures of culture of leisure, but it still includes country-of-residence attributes as
well as the tax rate in the country of origin. Analogously, in Equation (3.6), the country-of residence variables,
including the tax rate, are replaced by country-of-residence fixed-effects (ω୨), whereas variables measuring country-
of-origin attributes, including proxies for culture of leisure, are retained.  Equation (3.5) allows me to investigate the
sensitivity of the tax impact when I control for country-of-origin differences by a set of country-of-origin fixed
effects.  Equation (3.6) does the reverse:  it allows me to analyze the sensitivity of the culture-of-leisure coefficient
when I control for the attributes of the countries of residence by a set of country-of-residence fixed-effects.
3.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The analyses are based on a number of different data sets.  Data on labor supply and personal attributes of
individuals are from the European Social Survey (ESS).  I use five cross-sectional rounds of the ESS, conducted
biennially between years 2004 and 2013. The ESS covers 35 European countries that participated in at least one
round of the survey. I include in the analysis 26 countries for which the OECD tax data are available.  The core
module of the ESS is administered in all rounds and contains information about respondents’ socio-economic
circumstances, including employment history and work-related variables. Starting with the second round, the ESS
asks its respondents the countries in which their mother and father were born, in addition to asking about
respondent’s own country of birth. My sample consists of second-generation immigrants. These individuals were
born in their country of residence but their fathers have migrated from a different country.
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3.4.1. Outcomes and Personal Attributes
The two outcome variables are labor force participation and hours of work for the individual. The labor
force participation variable takes the value of one if the individual reported being engaged in any paid work in the
last 7 days or has been unemployed and is actively looking for a job.  The second measure of labor supply quantifies
the intensive margin, where the outcome is hours normally worked in a week at the respondent’s main job.  This
information is obtained from individuals who are either working at the time of the interview or have worked in the
past. In the former case, hours worked pertains to hours at the current job, while in the latter case, hours worked
corresponds to the hours worked at the respondents’ last job. I know the year in which this last job was held and I
limit the sample to those who last worked in the year 2000 or later. The reason is twofold: first, the OECD tax
measure is only available after year 2000, and second, measurement error is likely to increase as people have to
recall their weekly work hours from further back in the past.
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample used in the hours worked equation.  The
descriptive statistics of the sample used in participation regressions are provided in Appendix D, Table D.2.
Although the samples in the labor force participation and the hours regressions are different by design, their
descriptive statistics are similar. The first panel of Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics by dividing the sample
by gender of the worker and further by the availability of the tax measure.  Average weekly hours worked is about
36 for females and 43 for males. Average age is about 41 for both sexes and average years of schooling is about 13
years.
3.4.2. Tax Measures
I employ two different tax measures.  The first tax measure comes from the OECD Tax Database. It is the
average personal income tax and the social security contribution rate on gross labor income for a single person
without a dependent. This tax measure is available for 26 countries in the ESS for all years from 2000 to 2013.  The
second tax measure is the effective marginal tax rate on labor income (τ) as used by others (e.g. Prescott 2004,
McDaniel 2011). I use the average tax series updated by McDaniel (2014) to construct τ.46 This tax measure is not
available for all 26 countries and for all years for which the OECD average tax rate is available. In particular,
46 The calculation of τ follows the formulation of Prescott (2004) and McDaniel (2011): τ = த౩౩ାଵ.଺∗த౟౤ౙାதౙ
ଵାதౙ
, where
τୱୱ, τ୧୬ୡ, and τୡ are taken from McDaniel (2014) data.
48
Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistics for the Hours Worked Sample
Females Males
Variable Description (Source)
Average
Tax
sample
߬
sample
Average
Tax
sample
߬
sample
Panel A: Personal Characteristics
Normal Weekly
   Hours
Hours normally worked in a week at the main
job as reported by the ESS respondents
36.693 35.916 43.549 42.802
(11.993) (12.301) (11.948) (11.950)
Age Age of the respondent
42.273 41.656 41.356 41.125
(12.668) (12.871) (13.297) (13.375)
Ethnic Minority ==1 if the respondent belongs to minorityethnic group in country
0.127 0.090 0.147 0.113
(0.333) (0.287) (0.354) (0.317)
Years of
   Schooling
Number of years of full-time education
completed
13.597 13.443 13.197 13.214
(3.492) (3.702) (3.459) (3.617)
Married ==1 if the respondent is married, 0 otherwise
0.539 0.488 0.537 0.500
(0.499) (0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
City ==1 if respondent lives in a big city, 0 otherwise
0.333 0.218 0.297 0.216
(0.471) (0.413) (0.457) (0.412)
Panel B: Culture of Leisure in Country of Origin
Leisure
   Important
Average country response to the question “How
important is Leisure Time in your life?” 1: ‘Not
at all important’ 2: ‘Not very important’ 3:
‘Rather important’ 4 ‘Very important’” (A)
3.070 3.117 3.083 3.118
(0.190) (0.199) (0.178) (0.182)
Generous
Holidays
Average country response to the question
“Please tell me if  generous Holidays are
important in a job.” 0: Not Important, 100: Very
important. (A)
34.744 30.956 34.324 31.369
(14.990) (12.820) (14.870) (13.244)
People Turn
   Lazy
Average country response to the question “Do
you agree or disagree with the following
statement: People who don't work turn lazy. 1
‘Strongly agree’ 2 ‘Agree’ 3 ‘Neither agree nor
disagree’ 4 ‘Disagree’ 5 ‘Strongly disagree’”
(A)
2.182 2.240 2.190 2.234
(0.304) (0.318) (0.306) (0.321)
Work Is a Duty
   to Society
Average country response to the question “Do
you agree or disagree with the following
statement: Work is a duty towards society.”
1: ‘Strongly agree’  2: ‘Agree’  3: ‘Neither agree
nor disagree’ 4: ‘Disagree’ 5: ‘Strongly
disagree’ (A)
2.269 2.256 2.253 2.236
(0.329) (0.252) (0.324) (0.262)
Work Should
   Come First
Average country response to the question “Do
you agree or disagree with the following
statement: Work should always come first, even
if it means less spare time.” 1: ‘Strongly agree’
2: ‘Agree’  3: ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ 4:
‘Disagree’ 5: ‘Strongly disagree’ (A)
2.551 2.613 2.560 2.600
(0.445) (0.402) (0.435) (0.405)
Average Weekly
   Hours
Weekly hours actually worked per employed
person in the country of origin (I)
35.547 35.079 41.855 41.845
(3.574) (3.531) (3.092) (3.048)
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Table 3.3 (Continued)
Females Males
Variable Description (Source) Average
Tax
sample
߬
sample
Average
Tax
sample
߬
sample
Panel C: Other Country of Origin Characteristics
Per capita
   Income
PPP adjusted GDP per capita in constant 2011
US$ (D)
24,519 28,563 25,470 28,652
(12,992) (13,329) (12,924) (13,133)
Ethnolinguistic
   Fragmentation
Roeder's 1985 Index of the extent of
ethnolinguistic fragmentation in the country (B)
0.272 0.238 0.264 0.239
(0.193) (0.199) (0.188) (0.197)
Democratic Number of years in which the countryexperienced democracy between 1930 and 1995
(C)
22.397 30.589 24.353 30.849
(24.976) (25.758) (25.055) (25.367)
British Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home country is
English Common Law, 0 otherwise (C)
0.099 0.133 0.097 0.122
(0.299) (0.340) (0.296) (0.328)
French Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home country is French
Commercial Code, 0 otherwise (C)
0.376 0.415 0.413 0.450
(0.484) (0.493) (0.493) (0.498)
Socialist/Comm.
   Legal Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home country is
Socialist/Communist Laws, 0 otherwise (C)
0.397 0.270 0.350 0.247
(0.489) (0.444) (0.477) (0.432)
German Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home country is
German Commercial Code, 0 otherwise (C)
0.079 0.115 0.098 0.130
(0.270) (0.319) (0.298) (0.337)
Scandinavian
   Legal Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home country is
Scandin. Commercial Code, 0 otherwise (C)
0.049 0.067 0.042 0.051
(0.216) (0.251) (0.200) (0.219)
% Catholic 1980 % Catholic in a country in 1980 (C)
31.794 45.138 35.046 46.263
(36.427) (37.028) (37.157) (36.856)
% Muslim 1980 % Muslim in a country in 1980 (C)
22.412 15.947 21.958 17.049
(38.369) (34.450) (38.257) (35.651)
% Protestant
   1980 % Protestant in a country in 1980 (C)
10.916 14.243 10.619 13.377
(22.721) (25.154) (21.964) (23.675)
% Other
   Denomin. 1980 % Other Denomination in a country in 1980 (C)
34.878 24.672 32.377 23.311
(35.100) (26.649) (34.007) (25.857)
Panel D: Country of Residence Characteristics
Average Tax
   Rate
Average personal income tax and social security
contribution rate on gross labor income for a
single person without a dependent (G)
25.407 26.398
(8.231) (8.676)
߬
The effective marginal tax rate calculated using
McDaniel data (H)
48.956 48.828
(9.372) (9.426)
Unemployment
   Rate Country unemployment rate (D)
7.590 7.038 7.583 7.139
(3.153) (2.955) (3.157) (3.015)
Per capita
   Income
PPP adjusted GDP per capita in constant 2011
US$ (D)
35,478 39,657 37,206 40,271
(11,195) (9,215) (12,722) (9,406)
Average Country
   Education
Average education of individuals aged 15 and
over in the country (E)
11.542 11.277 11.491 11.315
(0.897) (0.974) (0.923) (0.944)
Population Country population in millions (D)
19.941 30.456 22.325 31.729
(25.761) (29.405) (27.445) (29.989)
Individualism Hofstede Index of the degree to whichindividuals are integrated into groups (F)
63.688 68.242 64.580 68.644
(11.555) (12.494) (11.307) (11.328)
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Table 3.3 (Continued)
Females Males
Variable Description (Source)
Average
Tax
sample
τ
sample
Average
Tax
sample
τ
sample
Ethnolinguistic
   Fragmentation
Roeder's 1985 Index of the extent of
ethnolinguistic fragmentation in the country (B)
0.313 0.278 0.318 0.292
(0.178) (0.191) (0.187) (0.201)
Democratic Number of years in which the country
experienced democracy during 1930-1995 (C)
42.853 50.973 44.644 52.220
(24.625) (22.305) (24.477) (21.294)
British Legal
  Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home country is
English Common Law, 0 otherwise (C)
0.287 0.112 0.232 0.101
(0.453) (0.316) (0.422) (0.302)
French Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home country is French
Commercial Code, 0 otherwise (C)
0.199 0.310 0.244 0.328
(0.399) (0.463) (0.430) (0.469)
Socialist/Comm.
   Legal Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home country is
Socialist/Communist Laws, 0 otherwise (C)
0.248 0.154 0.228 0.136
(0.432) (0.361) (0.419) (0.343)
German Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home country is
German Commercial Code, 0 otherwise (C)
0.168 0.288 0.198 0.309
(0.374) (0.453) (0.399) (0.462)
Scandinavian
   Legal Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home country is
Scandin. Commercial Code, 0 otherwise (C)
0.098 0.136 0.098 0.126
(0.298) (0.343) (0.297) (0.332)
% Catholic 1980 % Catholic in a country in 1980 (C)
31.747 49.905 36.258 51.067
(34.614) (30.920) (35.250) (30.705)
% Muslim 1980 % Muslim in a country in 1980 (C)
2.277 0.829 2.053 0.823
(4.404) (0.997) (5.665) (0.998)
% Protestant
   1980 % Protestant in a country in 1980 (C)
27.803 27.502 28.046 27.575
(30.374) (28.591) (30.325) (28.850)
% Other
   Denomin. 1980 % Other Denomination in a country in 1980 (C)
38.173 21.764 33.643 20.534
(32.659) (21.311) (31.243) (20.649)
N 2909 1649 2738 1719
Personal characteristics variables data come from the ESS survey. I restrict the sample to second-generation
immigrants who are either working at the time of the interview or have held their last job in year 2000 or later and
are/were between 16 and 64 years of age at the time of working. I also exclude individuals who reported either
zero hours normally worked or more than 100 hours. Survey weights are used.
߬ sample includes the following countries of destination: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Average Tax Rate sample includes the following
additional countries of destination: Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, and Turkey.
A: World Values Survey and European Values Study data. The original variable Leisure Important had reverse
scale; it was recoded so that higher values correspond to “lazier” culture.
B: Philip G. Roeder, 2001. “Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985”
<http://pages.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm>; C: Teorell, Jan, Nicholas Charron, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg,
Bo Rothstein, Petrus Sundin and Richard Svensson, 2013. “The Quality of Government Dataset” version
qog_std_cs_20dec13 <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>; D: World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database
<http://databank.worldbank.org /data/databases.aspx>; E: Barro and Lee data set version BL2013_MF1599_v2.0
<http://www.barrolee.com/data/full1.htm>. The variable is available for the years 2000, 2005, and 2010; the
values in between are interpolated; years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 are assigned the 2010 value; F: Hofstede,
G. “Cultural Dimensions” <http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html>. G: OECD Tax Database Table 5
<http://stats.oecd.org.libezp.lib.lsu.edu/index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE_I5#>; H:
<http://www.caramcdaniel.com/researchpapers>; I: International Labor Organization ILOSTAT Database annual
weekly hours actually worked per employed person gender-specific indicator, averaged over the period since year
2000.
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Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, and Turkey have missing data for all years. Thus, the regressions that
use ߬ are based on smaller samples. Table 3.4 displays the tax rates for countries in which the individuals in our
sample reside.  The two measures are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.73.  The tax variables are
merged with the individual-level data based on the year of work when the outcome is the weekly hours normally
worked, and based on the year of interview when the outcome is labor force participation.
Table 3.4
Tax Rates in Countries of Residence
Country τ Average Personal Income Tax
Austria 56.486 32.627
Belgium 57.293 42.426
Czech Republic 45.076 22.977
Denmark 62.847 40.830
Estonia 20.230
Finland 55.364 30.490
France 55.252 28.276
Germany 52.082 41.545
Greece 42.194 24.172
Hungary 52.668 35.680
Iceland 28.147
Ireland 41.181 16.643
Israel 20.903
Italy 53.137 28.983
Luxembourg 25.884
Netherlands 48.625 31.963
Norway 50.617 29.769
Poland 41.895 26.709
Portugal 40.674 22.701
Slovak Republic 39.054 21.653
Slovenia 45.979 34.285
Spain 42.095 20.636
Sweden 63.378 28.651
Switzerland 30.547 17.496
Turkey 29.667
United Kingdom 43.532 25.804
Mean 48.570 28.044
Std. Dev. (8.398) (7.011)
The first tax measure (߬) is the effective marginal tax rate on labor income (Prescott 2004).
The second tax measure is the average personal income tax and social security contribution rate on gross
labor income for a single person without a dependent earning 100% of average earnings of industry workers
in the country (Source: OECD Tax Database Table 5).
The tax values are averaged for the period 2000 to 2013.
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3.4.3. Measures of Culture of Leisure in the Country of Origin
To construct culture of leisure measures, I use data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the
European Values Study (EVS).  I employ the five cross-sectional waves of the WVS (1981–1984, 1990–1993,
1995–1997, 1999–2004, and 2005-2009). The WVS coverage starts with 22 countries in the 1981-1984 wave, and
reaches 87 countries by the time of the 2005-2009 wave. The WVS asks its respondents about their attitudes
regarding a variety of topics, including religion, political preferences, family values and work ethics.
The European Values Study (EVS) consists of four waves of cross-sectional surveys conducted in 49
predominantly European countries (1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, and 2008-2010). The formulation of EVS
questions about attitudes to work and leisure is identical to the WVS formulation.  By pooling the WVS and the
EVS, I am able cover a large number of countries around the world to gauge the beliefs about the importance of
work and leisure in people’s lives in these countries.
The descriptions of the variables and their sample means and standard deviations are provided in Panel B of
Table 3.3.  I created five variables to measure the extent of culture of leisure.  Higher values of each variable
represent a higher appreciation of leisure in that country.  The first variable Leisure Important is the average
response in the country to the question “Indicate how important leisure time is in your life.”  Potential answers range
from 1 “Not at all important” to 4 “Very important.”  Table 3.3 shows that for individuals who enter the hours of
work regressions the average value of this variable is 3.1.  Appendix Table D.1 displays the average response to
Leisure Important variable in each of the countries that represent the country-of-origin of the immigrant father.  For
example, the value of Leisure Important is 3.251 in Austria.47  In comparison, the average value of Cyprus is 3.47,
indicating that Cypriots attach a higher value to leisure than Austrians do.48
The second variable that gauges culture of leisure in a country is based on the question of “Do you agree or
disagree with the statement: People who don’t work turn lazy.” Possible answers range from 1 “Strongly agree” to 5
“Strongly disagree.”  A higher value indicates a more tolerant attitude towards not working.  The third and fourth
variables in this group are measured similarly, and they are based on answers to the following questions: “Do you
agree or disagree with the statement: Work is a duty toward society,” and “Do you agree or disagree with the
47 This number is the average response of 4,353 Austrians surveyed in various waves of the WVS and the EVS
between 1990 and 2010.
48 The average Cypriot response is based on 1,969 Cypriots who were surveyed in various waves between 2005 and
2010.
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statement: Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time.”  A fifth variable is created to measure
the extent of appreciation of leisure in a country by calculating the proportion of people in the country who believe
that provision of generous holidays is an important aspect of a job.
Finally, I created two additional measures that capture the extent of labor market attachment in the country-
of-origin.  They are the labor force participation rates and average weekly hours worked in father’s country-of-
origin.  Labor force participation in the country of ancestry has been used before as a cultural proxy for work
(Fernádez and Fogli 2009, Fernández and Fogli 2006). I calculate these variables by gender.  This allows for
conducting more nuanced analyses.  For example, I can investigate how the labor supply decision of a female
second-generation immigrant in Europe is impacted by the intensity of labor market activity of women in the
country from which this person’s father migrated.  Furthermore, I fine-tuned this measure to connect it to the
relevant age groups using the age bands of 15-24, 25-54 and 55-64.49
Similarly, I obtained weekly hours actually worked per employed person in the country of origin. The data
come from the International Labor Organization ILOSTAT Database. Because the annual data are not available for
every year and country, I use averaged available values over the time period 2000 to 2013. The ILOSTAT indicator
covers both employees and the self-employed and it counts hours people have worked either on all jobs, or, in some
country-years, at their main and second job only. Both part-time and full-time employment hours are accounted
for.50  The measure of weekly hours in the country of origin is gender-specific, but not age-group specific, as the
ILOSTAT does not provide an age group-specific indicator.
3.4.4. Country Attributes
In each specification, I also control for a host of country characteristics both in the country of respondent’s
residence and in his/her father’s country of origin.  These variables include, among others, ethno-linguistic
fragmentation, the legal origin of the country, the religious composition of the country, and the number of years in
which the country was democratic from 1930 to 1995. Additionally, the models include per capita income, average
49 For example, I connected the propensity to participate in the labor market of a female 2nd generation immigrant in
Europe who is 20 years old to the  labor force participation rate of women aged 15-24 in her father’s country of
origin.  Country-age-and gender specific labor force participation rates were obtained from the International Labor
Organization ILOSTAT database. Because the annual data are not available for every year, country, and age band, I
use averaged available values over the time period 2002 to 2013.
50 In addition, the ILOSTAT provides a number of flags indicating data inconsistencies that can complicate analysis
across time and countries. For example, in China, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Egypt, Pakistan, Panama, Viet Nam, and
Zimbabwe only full-time employment hours are counted, and I exclude these countries from our sample.
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country education, unemployment rate, population size, and individualism index in the country of residence. The
full definitions and the descriptive statistics of these and other country attributes used in the regressions are
presented in panels C and D of Table 3.3.
3.5.  Results
Table 3.5 displays the summary results for females.  Panel A presents the coefficients of tax and culture
variables in the labor force participation equation, and Panel B presents the estimated tax and culture coefficients
from the hours equation for those who reported positive work hours.  All models include control variables pertaining
to the individual, country of ancestry and country of residence.  These variables are summarized in panels A, C, and
D of Table 3.3. The coefficients of these variables are not reported in the interest of space, although in Appendix
Table D.3 I display the full set of coefficients of the model in column (1) of Panel A in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 presents six specifications in six columns.  Each specification includes a different culture of
leisure construct, which is displayed at the column header.  For example, in the model of column (1) culture of
leisure is measured by the mean value of the question that gauges the importance of leisure in people’s lives (Leisure
Important).  Similarly, in column (2) culture of leisure is measured by responses to the statement of “People who
don’t work turn lazy” in the country of origin. Higher values of culture variables in columns (1) to (5) indicate
stronger preference for leisure. Thus, the estimated coefficient of culture of leisure in these columns is expected to
be negative.  In column (6), culture is measured by the labor force participation rate in the country of origin when I
estimate models on the extensive margin (Panel A), or as the average hours worked in the country of origin when I
estimate models on the intensive margin (Panel B).  The coefficients of these variables are expected to be positive to
the extent that work effort in the country of ancestry is a cultural attribute transmitted to the offspring.
Both Panels A and B of Table 3.5 have two sections.  The models in the top section of each panel use the
first tax measure (average tax), while the models in the bottom section employ ߬ (effective marginal tax) as the
measure of the tax rate in the country.  Panel A of Table 3.5 shows that taxes have a negative impact on female labor
force participation in all models when taxes are measured by the average tax.  The same is true also in models where
taxes are measured by the effective marginal tax rate ߬, although the point estimates are significant only at the 15-20
percent level.
 Culture of leisure in the country of origin has a negative and statistically significant impact on female labor
force participation in models displayed in columns (1) and (5). In the regression reported in column (6), culture of
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Table 3.5
The Impact of Tax Rates and Culture of Leisure on Labor Supply--Females
Panel A
Dependent variable: Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
LFP in Origin
Country
Models with the Average Personal Income Tax Rate
Average Tax -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Culture -0.133*** -0.036 -0.022 0.006 -0.001*** 0.003***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.047) (0.034) (0.000) (0.001)
N 3770 3489 3489 3489 3626 2705
Models with the Effective Marginal Tax Rate
߬ -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Culture -0.128*** -0.069* -0.067 -0.022 -0.002*** 0.003**
(0.037) (0.040) (0.045) (0.036) (0.000) (0.001)
N 2204 2091 2091 2091 2165 1864
Panel B
Dependent variable: Weekly Hours Normally Worked in Main Job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
Average
Hours in
Origin
Country
Models with the Average Personal Income Tax Rate
Average Tax -0.083* -0.102** -0.106** -0.108** -0.083** -0.123**
(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.048)
Culture 0.892 -2.233* -2.505* -1.799* 0.014 -0.029
(1.843) (1.138) (1.309) (1.051) (0.022) (0.182)
N 2909 2676 2676 2676 2796 1920
Models with the Effective Marginal Tax Rate
߬ -0.270*** -0.288*** -0.289*** -0.297*** -0.289*** -0.315***
(0.066) (0.071) (0.069) (0.068) (0.065) (0.072)
Culture 0.286 -3.052** -2.692 -3.656*** 0.057** 0.115
(1.890) (1.197) (1.778) (1.296) (0.026) (0.226)
N 1649 1555 1555 1555 1619 1392
߬ – The effective marginal tax rate on labor income (Prescott 2004).
Average Tax – Average personal income tax and social security contribution rate on gross labor income for a
single person without a dependent (OECD Tax Database Table 5).
Each regression includes the control variables listed in Panels A, C, and D of Table 3.3.
Standard errors, clustered at the country of origin, are in parentheses. The estimations use sampling weights and
include survey year dummies. * p < 0.1, ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
leisure is measured by female labor force participation in the country-of-ancestry.  Its coefficient is positive as
expected, and significantly different from zero.  When culture of leisure is measured by the variable People Turn
Lazy, its impact on labor force participation is significantly different from zero in the model that uses the marginal
tax rate ߬.
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 Panel B presents the results where the dependent variable is hours worked for females, conditional on
working.  Both higher taxes in the country of residence and higher culture of leisure in the country of origin reduce
female hours.  Culture coefficients are statistically different from zero in models 2, 3, and 4 when taxes are
measured by average personal income tax rate for a single person without a dependent, and in models 2, 4 and 5
with effective marginal tax rate on labor income, although the coefficient is positive in model 5.  The picture that
emerges in Table 3.5 is that for females, taxes have a negative impact on labor supply both at the extensive and
intensive margins, and culture of leisure also negatively impacts labor supply, although the precision of the
estimated coefficients varies between specifications.
Table 3.6 reports the results of the same models for males.  In Panel A, I observe that taxes have a negative
impact on labor force participation, regardless of the measure of culture and regardless of the measure of taxes.  On
the other hand, the coefficients of culture variables are never statistically different from zero.  Panel B summarizes
the models that investigate hours worked for males, conditional on working.  While there is strong evidence on the
impact of taxes on labor male labor supply, culture of leisure has no impact on hours worked for males.
It is possible that second-generation Muslim immigrants are different from non-Muslim immigrants in a
number of dimensions ranging from labor market attachment and the impact of culture of leisure.  This may be
particularly true for Muslim women.  To investigate if the results are sensitive to the behavior of Muslim
immigrants, I dropped from the sample the individuals whose fathers have migrated from Morocco, Turkey, Algeria,
Iraq and Iran. The overwhelming majority of the population in these countries adheres to Islam, and these countries
represent the largest Muslim immigrant groups in the data.  The results for women are presented in Table 3.7.
Sample sizes decline by 500 to 700 observations because of the omission of Muslim immigrants, but the results are
very similar to those displayed in Table 3.5, although the impact of taxes is weaker in the labor force participation
regressions.  Table 3.8 presents the results for non-Muslim immigrant men.  This table is the counterpart to Table
3.6 and the results are very similar between the two tables.  Thus, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show that the results are not
impacted by the inclusion or exclusion of Muslim immigrants to the analysis.
In Table 3.9, I summarize these results by reporting them in elasticity form.  The elasticities with respect to
taxes are based on median estimate of the effective marginal tax rate coefficients, and the elasticity with respect to
culture is the median estimate within the relevant panels of Tables 3.5 and 3.6.  The implied aggregate hours
elasticity for taxes is -0.65 for females and -0.54 for males.  The impact of culture of leisure, expressed in elasticity
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Table 3.6
The Impact of Tax Rates and Culture of Leisure on Labor Supply--Males
Panel A
Dependent variable: Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
LFP in Origin
Country
Models with the Average Personal Income Tax Rate
Average Tax -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Culture 0.020 0.008 0.028 0.024 -0.000 -0.001
(0.045) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.000) (0.001)
N 3295 3060 3060 3060 3178 2313
Models with the Effective Marginal Tax Rate
߬ -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Culture 0.081 -0.003 0.022 0.042 -0.000 -0.001
(0.058) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033) (0.001) (0.001)
N 2022 1913 1913 1913 1998 1692
Panel B
Dependent variable: Weekly Hours Normally Worked in Main Job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
Average
Hours in
Origin
Country
Models with the Average Personal Income Tax Rate
Average Tax -0.092** -0.094* -0.092* -0.097* -0.099** -0.094*
(0.043) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.044) (0.051)
Culture 2.302 1.359 2.718 3.805*** 0.014 -0.390
(2.140) (1.536) (1.935) (1.229) (0.022) (0.364)
N 2738 2533 2533 2533 2652 1876
Models with the Effective Marginal Tax Rate
߬ -0.191** -0.191** -0.194** -0.189** -0.193** -0.191**
(0.074) (0.079) (0.077) (0.075) (0.075) (0.084)
Culture 2.064 1.275 3.207 3.224* 0.006 -0.488
(2.752) (1.579) (2.286) (1.692) (0.026) (0.493)
N 1719 1624 1624 1624 1703 1436
߬ – The effective marginal tax rate on labor income (Prescott 2004).
Average Tax – Average personal income tax and social security contribution rate on gross labor income for a
single person without a dependent (OECD Tax Database Table 5).
Each regression includes the control variables listed in Panels A, C, and D of Table 3.3.
Standard errors, clustered at the country of origin, are in parentheses. The estimations use sampling weights and
include survey year dummies. * p < 0.1, ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.7
The Impact of Tax Rates and Culture of Leisure on Labor Supply--Females
Excluding Muslim Immigrants
Panel A
Dependent variable: Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
LFP in Origin
Country
Models with the Average Personal Income Tax Rate
Average Tax -0.002 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Culture -0.110** -0.019 -0.021 0.033 -0.001 0.002**
(0.045) (0.039) (0.050) (0.041) (0.001) (0.001)
N 3075 3033 3033 3033 3023 2249
Models with the Effective Marginal Tax Rate
߬ -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Culture -0.116** -0.064 -0.125*** -0.048 -0.001 0.003**
(0.051) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.001) (0.001)
N 1890 1851 1851 1851 1851 1624
Panel B
Dependent variable: Weekly Hours Normally Worked in Main Job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
Average
Hours in
Origin
Country
Models with the Average Personal Income Tax Rate
Average Tax -0.092** -0.085* -0.089* -0.091** -0.095** -0.108**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.049)
Culture -3.499 -2.534** -2.975** -2.703** -0.062 -0.038
(2.570) (1.181) (1.393) (1.112) (0.037) (0.181)
N 2383 2352 2352 2352 2352 1799
Models with the Effective Marginal Tax Rate
߬ -0.241*** -0.245*** -0.257*** -0.251*** -0.260*** -0.260***
(0.065) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068)
Culture -5.396* -3.239** -1.498 -3.728** -0.067 0.188
(2.636) (1.251) (1.957) (1.497) (0.054) (0.240)
N 1446 1416 1416 1416 1416 1311
߬ – The effective marginal tax rate on labor income (Prescott 2004).
Average Tax – Average personal income tax and social security contribution rate on gross labor income for a
single person without a dependent (OECD Tax Database Table 5).
Each regression includes the control variables listed in Panels A, C, and D of Table 3.3.
Standard errors, clustered at the country of origin, are in parentheses. The estimations use sampling weights and
include survey year dummies. * p < 0.1, ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
59
Table 3.8
The Impact of Tax Rates and Culture of Leisure on Labor Supply--Males
Excluding Muslim Immigrants
Panel A
Dependent variable: Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
LFP in Origin
Country
Models with the Average Personal Income Tax Rate
Average Tax -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Culture 0.004 0.033 0.020 0.030 -0.001 -0.000
(0.061) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.002) (0.001)
N 2670 2646 2646 2646 2633 1899
Models with the Effective Marginal Tax Rate
߬ -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Culture -0.020 0.006 0.012 0.035 -0.003* -0.001
(0.060) (0.035) (0.043) (0.040) (0.001) (0.001)
N 1687 1663 1663 1663 1663 1442
Panel B
Dependent variable: Weekly Hours Normally Worked in Main Job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
Average
Hours in
Origin
Country
Models with the Average Personal Income Tax Rate
Average Tax -0.094 -0.096 -0.093 -0.097 -0.094 -0.083
(0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.059)
Culture -1.181 1.541 2.410 3.115** 0.115** -0.305
(3.910) (1.578) (2.115) (1.439) (0.054) (0.399)
N 2235 2219 2219 2219 2219 1741
Models with the Effective Marginal Tax Rate
߬ -0.199** -0.200** -0.202** -0.200** -0.188* -0.191*
(0.094) (0.097) (0.095) (0.094) (0.097) (0.099)
Culture -0.409 1.511 4.142 2.942 0.112* -0.454
(4.897) (1.584) (2.729) (1.837) (0.063) (0.513)
N 1470 1454 1454 1454 1454 1335
߬ – The effective marginal tax rate on labor income (Prescott 2004).
Average Tax  – Average personal income tax and social security contribution rate on gross labor income for a
single person without a dependent (OECD Tax Database Table 5).
Each regression includes the control variables listed in Panels A, C, and D of Table 3.3.
Standard errors, clustered at the country of origin, are in parentheses. The estimations use sampling weights and
include survey year dummies. * p < 0.1, ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.9
Elasticities
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Females Tax Rate -0.25 -0.40
Culture of Leisure -0.15 -0.15
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Table 3.9 (Continued)
Males Tax Rate -0.32 -0.22
Culture of Leisure 0.00 0.00
terms, is smaller than the impact of taxes, but still sizable for female labor supply, while culture of leisure has no
impact on men’s labor market activity.
To put these elasticities in perspective, note for example, that in Belgium average hours per working age
population was 989 in 2012, and the effective marginal tax rate was 58%.  In Portugal, average hours worked in
2012 was 1,237 and the effective marginal tax rate was 42%.  If the tax rate in Belgium went down 16 percentage
points to bring it down to the level prevailing in Portugal, this would have been a 28 percent reduction.  Using the
elasticity estimates for men and women in Table 3.9, and using the weights of men and women in employment, I
find that aggregate hours would go up by 16% or by 158 hours per working-age person.  This would help close the
gap in hours of work between Belgium and Portugal (see Table 3.1) by about 64%.
The mean value of the response to the question of Work is a Duty to Society is 2.3 in Belgium.  If the tastes
for leisure were weaker so that the mean response to this question were 1.91 (the level in Portugal), this would
constitute a 17% decline in the intensity of tastes for leisure.  This particular change in preferences would impact
hours worked only through its effect on females, because in the case of males neither participation nor hours respond
to changes in culture of leisure. The impact on aggregate hours worked per working age population would be an
increase by 20 hours (about 2%).  This would close the gap in hours worked between Belgium and Portugal by 8%.
Table 3.10 reports the same models reported earlier, but these models include country-of-origin fixed-
effects.  As a result, the impact of leisure variables cannot be identified, but I can investigate whether the impact of
taxes is altered by this specification.  Table 3.10 displays the coefficients of the average and marginal taxes in both
the participation and hours equations.  They are very similar to those reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.  For example,
the top panel of Table 3.5 shows that the coefficients of the average tax in the labor force participation regression are
-0.003 or -0.004, depending on the model.  Column (1) of Table 3.10 shows that the coefficient of average tax is
-0.004 for female participation equation in the models with country of origin fixed effects.   For men, the top panel
of Table 3.6 shows that the coefficient of average tax is -0.003 in most participation models, and column (3) of
Table 3.10 reports the same magnitude as the tax coefficient.  Other coefficients are also comparable between Tables
3.5, 3.6 and 3.10.  For example, the bottom panel of Table 3.5 shows that the coefficient of the effective marginal
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Table 3.10
The Impact of Tax Rates on Labor Supply
Models with Country of Origin Fixed Effects
Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor Force
Participation Weekly Hours
Labor Force
Participation Weekly Hours
Models with the Average Personal Income Tax Rate
Average Tax -0.004** -0.062 -0.003** -0.119***
(0.001) (0.044) (0.001) (0.043)
N 3770 2909 3295 2738
Models with the Effective Marginal Tax Rate
߬ -0.003 -0.242*** -0.004** -0.221***
(0.003) (0.077) (0.002) (0.074)
N 2204 1649 2022 1719
߬ – The effective marginal tax rate on labor income (Prescott 2004).
Average Tax – Average personal income tax and social security contribution rate on gross labor income for a
single person without a dependent (OECD Tax Database Table 5).
Each regression includes the control variables listed in Panels A, C, and D of Table 3.3.
Standard errors, clustered at the country of origin, are in parentheses. The estimations use sampling weights and
include survey year and country of origin dummies. * p < 0.1, ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
tax rate on hours worked for women ranges from -0.27 to -0.31.  The corresponding coefficient in column (2) of
Table 3.10 is -0.242.
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 display the results of the analogous exercise, but in this case, I replace the country-of-
residence variables, including the tax rates, with country of residence dummies.  Country-of-origin variables,
including leisure measures, are retained. Table 3.11 presents the results for females.  The estimated coefficients of
various measures of leisure are consistent with the ones reported earlier in both participation and hours decisions,
but the statistical significant is spotty.  The results for males, shown in Table 3.12, are also consistent with those
reported earlier: taste for leisure is not a statistically significant determinant of men’s labor market activity.
3.6. Potential Self-Selection of Immigrant Fathers
First-generation immigrants are a self-selected group of people who chose to leave their country-of-origin
and migrate to another country.  Thus, their unobserved attributes, including their propensity to work, may be
different from the general population.  This could be an issue if the first-generation immigrants (who are the fathers
of our survey respondents) have self-selected themselves into destination countries based on the tax rates of those
countries.  For example, if people from countries with a strong culture of leisure choose to migrate to countries with
high tax rates, and if the first-generation’s taste for leisure is transmitted to the second-generation, then the impact of
taxes on the labor supply of second generation will be estimated with bias.  To shed light on this issue, I divided the
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Table 3.11
The Impact of Culture of Leisure on Labor Supply--Females
Models with Country of Residence Fixed Effects
Panel A
Dependent variable: Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
LFP in Origin
Country
Average Personal Income Tax Rate Sample
Culture -0.113*** -0.041 -0.059 0.006 -0.001*** 0.003***
Coefficient (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.031) (0.000) (0.001)
N 3770 3489 3489 3489 3626 2705
Effective Marginal Tax Rate Sample
Culture -0.111** -0.075* -0.124** -0.030 -0.001*** 0.003**
Coefficient (0.043) (0.042) (0.046) (0.038) (0.000) (0.001)
N 2204 2091 2091 2091 2165 1864
Panel B
 Dependent variable: Weekly Hours Normally Worked in Main Job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
Average
Hours in
Origin
Country
Average Personal Income Tax Rate Sample
Culture 0.308 -1.794 -1.659 -1.872* 0.010 -0.002
Coefficient (1.878) (1.140) (1.292) (1.092) (0.024) (0.194)
N 2909 2676 2676 2676 2796 1920
Effective Marginal Tax Rate Sample
Culture -0.189 -2.798* -1.831 -3.749** 0.048 0.129
Coefficient (2.067) (1.392) (1.636) (1.412) (0.029) (0.250)
N 1649 1555 1555 1555 1619 1392
Each regression includes the control variables listed in Panels A, C, and D of Table 3.3.
Standard errors, clustered at the country of origin, are in parentheses. The estimations use sampling weights and
include survey year and country of destination dummies. * p < 0.1, ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.12
The Impact of Culture of Leisure on Labor Supply--Males
Models with Country of Residence Fixed Effects
Panel A
Dependent variable: Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
LFP in Origin
Country
Average Personal Income Tax Rate Sample
Culture 0.020 0.018 0.041 0.040 -0.000 -0.001
Coefficient (0.045) (0.039) (0.036) (0.033) (0.000) (0.001)
N 3295 3060 3060 3060 3178 2313
Effective Marginal Tax Rate Sample
Culture 0.076 0.010 0.034 0.048 0.000 -0.001
Coefficient (0.054) (0.035) (0.039) (0.032) (0.001) (0.001)
N 2022 1913 1913 1913 1998 1692
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Table 3.12 (Continued)
Panel B
Dependent variable: Weekly Hours Normally Worked in Main Job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leisure
Important
People Turn
Lazy
Work Is a
Duty to
Society
Work Should
Come First
Generous
Holidays
Average
Hours in
Origin
Country
Average Personal Income Tax Rate Sample
Culture 1.642 0.844 1.789 3.429** 0.015 -0.318
Coefficient (2.182) (1.562) (2.018) (1.316) (0.022) (0.405)
N 2738 2533 2533 2533 2652 1876
Effective Marginal Tax Rate Sample
Culture 1.437 0.752 2.484 2.702 0.005 -0.357
Coefficient (2.835) (1.661) (2.285) (1.697) (0.026) (0.511)
N 1719 1624 1624 1624 1703 1436
Each regression includes the control variables listed in Panels A, C, and D of Table 3.3.
Standard errors, clustered at the country of origin, are in parentheses. The estimations use sampling weights and
include survey year and country of destination dummies. * p < 0.1, ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
sample into two groups: immigrants in destination countries with above-median tax rates, and immigrant in
destination countries with below-median tax rates.  I calculated the mean values of the culture of leisure variables
using each second-generation immigrant’s country of heritage.  Table 3.13 shows that there are 2,957 second-
generation immigrants in the data set whose fathers have migrated to high-tax countries, and that the average tax rate
in those countries is 34.59%.  There are 4,108 second-generation immigrants in the data set who live in low-tax
countries, with an average tax rate of 19.9%.  The mean value of the Leisure Important variable is 3.12 in the former
group and it is 3.04 in the latter.  This indicates that the average taste for leisure in the country of origin of second-
generation immigrants who live in high-tax countries is not different from the taste for leisure in countries of origin
of other second-generation immigrants who live in low-tax countries.  The same picture emerges when considering
People Turn Lazy variable.  The mean value of this variable attached to those who live in high-tax countries is 2.20,
whereas it is 2.15 for those who live in low-tax countries.  Similarly, the mean values of Work Is a Duty to Society,
Work Should Come First and Generous Holidays variables are very similar between the two groups. Columns 3-6
show that the same conclusion is reached when analyzing women and men separately.  Thus, Table 3.13 indicates
that the taste for leisure in the country of origin is the same between migrants who migrated to high-tax or to low-tax
countries.  This provides evidence against the hypothesis that tastes for leisure might have motivated people to
migrate based on the tax rates in the countries of destination.
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Table 3.13
Balance of Covariates for High and Low Tax Destination Countries
Variable Both Genders Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Tax
Countries
Low Tax
Countries
High Tax
Countries
Low Tax
Countries
High Tax
Countries
Low Tax
Countries
Average Tax Rate
34.595 19.903 34.350 19.695 34.856 20.148
(5.959) (3.335) (5.803) (3.205) (6.113) (3.467)
Culture of Leisure in the Country of Origin by Migration Destination (High Tax vs. Low Tax Countries)
Leisure Important
3.122 3.040 3.127 3.039 3.118 3.041
(0.180) (0.198) (0.180) (0.198) (0.179) (0.198)
People Turn Lazy
2.204 2.146 2.218 2.141 2.189 2.152
(0.335) (0.288) (0.337) (0.287) (0.332) (0.289)
Work Is a Duty to
Society
2.202 2.266 2.215 2.268 2.188 2.263
(0.306) (0.351) (0.298) (0.352) (0.313) (0.350)
Work Should Come
First
2.548 2.521 2.560 2.512 2.536 2.531
(0.452) (0.447) (0.452) (0.453) (0.452) (0.441)
Generous Holidays
32.715 36.831 32.231 37.030 33.231 36.597
(15.643) (14.759) (15.429) (14.800) (15.858) (14.712)
Survey Participant (Second-generation Immigrant) Characteristics by Country of Residence (High Tax vs. Low
Tax Countries)
Labor Force
Participation
0.700 0.740 0.665 0.687 0.737 0.803
(0.459) (0.438) (0.472) (0.464) (0.441) (0.398)
Years of Schooling
13.126 13.125 13.200 13.294 13.048 12.926
(3.580) (3.417) (3.619) (3.391) (3.537) (3.438)
Father Completed
Upper-Secondary
Education
0.553 0.566 0.547 0.573 0.559 0.559
(0.497) (0.496) (0.498) (0.495) (0.497) (0.497)
Father Worked when
respondent was 14
years old
0.880 0.904 0.878 0.892 0.883 0.919
(0.325) (0.294) (0.328) (0.311) (0.322) (0.274)
N 2957 4108 1527 2243 1430 1865
Personal characteristics variables data come from the ESS survey. High Tax sample includes the following
countries of destination: Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Hungary, Slovenia, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland,
Norway, Turkey, Italy, Sweden, and France. Low Tax sample includes the following countries of destination:
Iceland, Poland, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Greece, Czech Republic, Portugal, the Slovak Republic,
Israel, Spain, Estonia, Switzerland, and Ireland.
Table 3.13 also demonstrates that the second-generation immigrations analyzed in the chapter have the
same average education levels regardless of whether they reside in a high-tax or low-tax country.  More importantly,
Table 3.13 shows that the education levels of the fathers of these individuals, who have chosen which country to
migrate to, are similar between high-tax and low-tax countries.  Fifty-five percent of the fathers who have chosen to
migrate to a high-tax country have completed upper secondary education.  The rate is about 57 percent among
immigrant fathers who have migrated to a low-tax country.  Finally, Table 3.13 also shows that labor force
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participation decisions of fathers who have migrated to high vs. low-tax countries were also similar.  That is, the
first-generation immigrants had similar labor market attachments regardless of whether they moved to a high-tax vs.
low-tax country.  In summary, Table 3.13 does not support the hypothesis that first-generation immigrants’
education levels, labor market attachments or the taste for leisure in their country of origin are related to the tax rates
in the country of destination.
3.7. Summary and Conclusion
There are substantial differences in aggregate hours worked between countries.  In an influential paper,
model Prescott (2004) argued using a growth model that virtually all of the difference in hours worked between the
U.S. and Europe could be explained by the differences in tax rates.  A large literature that followed Prescott (2004)
provided various extensions ranging from consideration of households’ self-insurance through asset accumulation
(Ljungqvist and Sargent 2006) to incorporation of household production (McDaniel 2011).
 Taxes distort the margin at which the market labor supply decision is made and higher taxes on labor
income motivate people to shift away from market work to leisure. The large magnitude of the labor supply response
in the Prescott framework, however, prompted the skeptics to suggest alternative or complementary mechanisms to
explain the labor supply differences between countries, including the importance of regulations and labor unions
(Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2005).  One important point in this framework is the assumption of homogeneous
preferences between countries. While it has been explicitly acknowledged that preferences for leisure may not be
identical between countries (Blanchard 2006), no research has addressed the question of whether or not the “aste for
leisure has a role in labor supply differences.
In this chapter, I use micro data from the European Social Survey that include information on labor force
participation and hours worked of second-generation immigrants who reside in 26 European countries.  These
individuals are born in Europe, and they have been exposed to institutional, legal and labor market structures of their
countries, including the tax rates.  Fathers of these individuals are first-generation immigrants and the data allow me
to identify 47 different countries they migrated from. I follow the recent literature on the impact of culture on
economic behavior (Alesina et al. 2015, Alesina and Giuliano 2010, Fernández 2011) and use the immigrant father’s
country of birth to determine the ancestral roots, and assume that culture of leisure in the father’s country of origin is
transmitted from the immigrant father to the offspring.
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Using the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, I construct measures of culture of leisure
in the country of origin of each immigrant father.  These measures include average responses in a country to such
questions as “How Important is leisure time in your life?”  “Do you agree or disagree with the statement: People
who don’t work turn lazy.”  “Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Work is a duty to society.”  “Do you
agree or disagree with the statement: Work should always come first even if it means less spare time.”  The details
of these and other variables that aim to gauge the extent of culture of leisure in the country of origin are provided in
the chapter.
I employ two different tax measures. The first one is the average personal income tax and the social
security contribution rate on gross labor income for a single person without a dependent. The second one is the
effective marginal tax rate on labor income.  I control for individual characteristics such age, education, marital
status, size of the city and ethnic minority status.  I also control for a large set of attributes of the country of
residence and country of origin, ranging from per capita income to the unemployment rate, from legal origin of the
country to the religious composition.  Thus, I am able to identify the impact of taxes on labor supply (both at the
extensive and intensive margin), holding constant observable attributes of individuals, various attributes of the
country in which they live, and attributes of their father’s country of origin, including the taste for leisure in that
country of origin.  Similarly, I can identify the impact of culture of leisure on labor supply, holding constant
personal characteristics and country attributes, including taxes.
It can be argued that migration decisions could be motivated by the tax rates in the destination countries.
For example, people from the countries where leisure is valued highly could have chosen to migrate to destination
countries which have high tax rates, perhaps because such countries could have more generous welfare benefits.  If
this is the case, self-selection of migrant fathers as a function of destination country tax rates could confound the
estimated impact of taxes on the labor supply of their children.  I show, however, that the taste for leisure in the
immigrants’ country of origin is not related to the tax rates in the country of destination.  Furthermore, education
levels and labor force participation rates of first-generation immigrants are very similar regardless of whether they
chose to migrate to a low-low or high-tax country of destination.
The results show that, for women, both taxes and culture of leisure impact participation and hours worked.
For men, taxes influence labor supply both at the intensive and the extensive margin, but culture of leisure has no
impact.  I find aggregate labor supply elasticity of -0.65 for women and -0.54 for men.  The elasticity for “taste for
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leisure” is -0.30 for women and zero for men.  These results suggest that while labor income tax is a significant
determinant of aggregate hours worked, culture of leisure in the country is important as well. Thus, my results
indicate that people would work less in a country if the tax rates or taste for leisure is higher in that country.
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION
4.1. Compulsory Schooling and the Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstitious Beliefs
Education provides monetary benefits because it increases productivity and earnings (Card 2001,
Oreopolous 2006).  Education also affects outcomes ranging from health (Clark and Royer 2013, Chou et al. 2010,
Grossman 2008) to fertility (Cygan-Rehm and Maeder 2013, Black et al. 2008, Osili and Long 2008). There are
other non-pecuniary benefits of education, for example, the positive influence on civic engagement (Dee 2004) and
information acquisition (Borgonovi et al. 2010).
In Chapter 2, I use compulsory schooling reforms implemented in European countries during the 1960s and
70s to identify the causal effect of education on religiosity and superstitious beliefs. I first show that the education
reforms increased individuals’ average level of education by about 5 months. Then I employ instrumental variable
analysis and find that an additional year of education has a significant negative impact on individual’s frequency of
religious service attendance, frequency of prayer, and propensity to report being on the upper end of the religiosity
scale.
In the second part half of Chapter 2, I apply the same empirical method to the European Values Study data
and find evidence that an additional year of schooling negatively impacts individuals’ propensities to believe in the
protective power of lucky charms, consult horoscopes, and take horoscopes into account in daily lives.
The effects estimated in Chapter 2 pertain to the individuals whose educational attainment was influenced
by the compulsory schooling reforms (local average treatment effects) and therefore are not readily generalizable to
the entire population. Nonetheless, a variety of robustness checks and placebo tests reveal that the estimates,
although large, are not a spurious product of a general trend towards secularity.
The results of Chapter 2 support the secularization hypothesis and fit into a broader line of recent research,
showing that cultural traits and individual preferences are malleable and react to external factors. For example,
Fernández (2013) shows that social attitudes towards women’s work endogenously change over time. Giuliano and
Spilimbergo (2014) report that individuals’ political preferences and their support for government redistribution
policies are impacted by whether or not they grew up during recessionary periods. D’Hombres and Nunziata find
that higher education improves attitudes towards immigrants, and Cannonier and Mocan (2012) find that, for women
in Sierra Leone, education encourages intolerance for violent cultural norms and behaviors. Giavazzi et al. (2014)
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show that cultural values evolve at different rates, while Mocan (2013) reports that the intensity of vengeful feelings
depends on the economic environment of the individual.
4.2. The Impact of Tax Rates and Culture of Leisure on Labor Supply in Europe
Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses on the cultural traits that are transmitted from father to offspring and
examines how culture of leisure and tax rates impact the labor supply of individuals (2nd generation immigrants)
residing in 26 European countries. I show that, for females, ancestral culture of leisure is an important determinant
of labor supply, adding to the existing evidence that cultural and institutional factors matter for economic outcomes
(Fernández 2011, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). In contrast, the results show no effect of culture of leisure in
males’ origin country on their labor supply. I consider these gender differences to be a reasonable finding, as one
would expect female labor supply to be relatively more elastic.
In Chapter 3, I additionally examine the impact of tax rates on labor force participation and usual weekly
hours of second-generation immigrants. I find that tax rates have a significant negative influence on labor supply of
males and females both at the extensive and intensive margins. To illustrate the magnitude of the tax rate impact, I
make a back-of-the-envelope calculation and find that if the effective marginal tax rate in Belgium went down to, for
example, the level of the tax rate prevailing in Portugal, the gap in annual hours of work per working age population
between Belgium and Portugal would close by about 64%.  In contrast, the impact of culture of leisure is much
smaller in this example. If the mean value of the variable Work is a Duty to Society decreased in Belgium to the
level observed in Portugal, the gap in annual hours worked would shrink only by about 8%.
The results of Chapter 3 complement the existing macroeconomic studies by offering novel estimates of the
impact of tax rates and culture of leisure on individuals’ labor supply. The findings are robust to controlling for
country-of-origin and country-of-residence fixed effects and using two different tax rate measures, as well as a
variety of culture of leisure measures. The results of Chapter 3 can be interpreted as evidence against the assumption
of homogeneous preferences for leisure across countries and indicate that such preferences may be an important
explanatory factor, among others, for the cross-country differences in annual hours worked.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2
Table A.1
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
OLS Results
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least once
a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... more
than once a
week
... every
day
Years of -0.002 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002
Schooling (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
{0.425} {0.769} {0.106} {0.216} {0.235} {0.335}
N 16337 16337 16163 16163 16163 16163
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s religiosity Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9, or
10 ... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
Years of -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004** -0.001 -0.003*
Schooling (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
{0.139} {0.103} {0.011}** {0.194} {0.633} {0.331}
N 16323 16323 16323 16323 16323 16323
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s belief
that lucky charm protects …
Individual consults
horoscope at least
monthly
Individual takes
into account
horoscope in daily
life sometimes
most of the time, or
always… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.009** -0.004*
Schooling (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
{0.010}** {0.007}*** {0.214} {0.243}
N 6969 6969 1650 1416
Please see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on standard
errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based on
standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.2
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
Using Individuals of All Ages
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient -0.122** -0.089** -0.093** -0.128** -0.097* -0.058
of Years of (0.052) (0.038) (0.046) (0.057) (0.050) (0.036)
Schooling {0.003}*** {0.020}** {0.045}** {0.020}** {0.034}** {0.203}
Reduced -0.050*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.050*** -0.038** -0.022*
Form (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012)
coefficient {0.006}*** {0.043}** {0.099}* {0.017}** {0.038}** {0.189}
N 16481 16481 16304 16304 16304 16304
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9,
or 10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient -0.087** -0.061** -0.021 -0.061 -0.072* -0.077**
of Years of (0.041) (0.027) (0.015) (0.043) (0.039) (0.039)
Schooling {0.057}* {0.018}** {0.161} {0.160} {0.145} {0.121}
Reduced -0.036*** -0.025*** -0.008 -0.025 -0.030** -0.032**
Form (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
coefficient {0.124} {0.021}** {0.262} {0.277} {0.116} {0.198}
N 16467 16467 16467 16467 16467 16467
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual
consults
horoscope at
least monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of
Years of Schooling
-0.108** -0.123** -0.124* -0.076*
(0.053) (0.056) (0.074) (0.040)
{0.012}** {0.006}*** {0.075}* {0.007}***
Reduced Form
coefficient
-0.055** -0.063*** -0.107** -0.090**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.041) (0.041)
{0.011}** {0.006}*** {0.087}* {0.003}***
N 7047 7047 1650 1416
Please see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on
standard errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based
on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.3
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
Excluding the 1953 cohort in France
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient -0.135** -0.098** -0.108* -0.150** -0.114* -0.070
of Years of (0.061) (0.045) (0.056) (0.074) (0.064) (0.044)
Schooling {0.004}*** {0.021}** {0.020}** {0.005}*** {0.019}** {0.067}*
Reduced -0.050*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.050*** -0.038** -0.023**
Form (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011)
coefficient {0.008}*** {0.046}** {0.072}* {0.019}** {0.036}** {0.178}
N 16360 16360 16188 16188 16188 16188
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9,
or 10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient -0.102** -0.059* -0.016 -0.064 -0.103** -0.100**
of Years of (0.048) (0.031) (0.018) (0.048) (0.051) (0.045)
Schooling {0.051}* {0.015}** {0.202} {0.214} {0.098}* {0.098}*
Reduced -0.038*** -0.022** -0.006 -0.023 -0.038*** -0.037***
Form (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011)
coefficient {0.051}* {0.070}* {0.444} {0.261} {0.076}* {0.043}**
N 16347 16347 16347 16347 16347 16347
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual
consults
horoscope at
least monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of
Years of Schooling
-0.120* -0.136** -0.131* -0.085*
(0.065) (0.068) (0.079) (0.045)
{0.011}** {0.006}*** {0.077}* {0.007}***
Reduced Form
coefficient
-0.054** -0.061*** -0.115** -0.100**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.044) (0.044)
{0.011}** {0.008}*** {0.087}* {0.007}***
N 6964 6964 1646 1416
Please see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on
standard errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based
on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.4
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
Treating all Pivotal Cohorts as Part of the Treatment Group
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient -0.108* -0.067 -0.116** -0.161** -0.109* -0.052
of Years of (0.055) (0.042) (0.056) (0.072) (0.058) (0.041)
Schooling {0.019}** {0.142} {0.010}** {0.004}*** {0.017}** {0.152}
Reduced -0.030*** -0.018* -0.033*** -0.045*** -0.031** -0.014
Form (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
coefficient {0.023}** {0.165} {0.019}** {0.014}** {0.027}** {0.259}
N 18400 18400 18200 18200 18200 18200
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9,
or 10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient -0.068 -0.048* -0.022 -0.035 -0.032 -0.041
of Years of (0.046) (0.029) (0.019) (0.046) (0.038) (0.040)
Schooling {0.187} {0.037}** {0.149} {0.475} {0.549} {0.519}
Reduced -0.019* -0.014* -0.006 -0.010 -0.009 -0.012
Form (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
coefficient {0.266} {0.090}* {0.153} {0.573} {0.565} {0.649}
N 18381 18381 18381 18381 18381 18381
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual
consults
horoscope at
least monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of
Years of Schooling
-0.051 -0.058 -0.204 -0.093*
(0.067) (0.070) (0.163) (0.056)
{0.444} {0.424} {0.015}** {0.030}**
Reduced Form
coefficient
-0.016 -0.018 -0.107*** -0.076**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.039) (0.036)
{0.434} {0.421} {0.015}** {0.030}**
N 7435 7435 1746 1503
Please see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on
standard errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based
on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.5
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
Using the dates in Table 1 of Brunello et al. (2013) to determine Pivotal Cohorts
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient -0.182** -0.110** -0.092* -0.160** -0.128** -0.080*
of Years of (0.075) (0.048) (0.051) (0.073) (0.064) (0.048)
Schooling {0.001}*** {0.028}** {0.030}** {0.004}*** {0.021}** {0.096}*
Reduced -0.062*** -0.037*** -0.030** -0.052*** -0.042*** -0.026**
Form (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
coefficient {0.004}*** {0.045}** {0.083}* {0.008}*** {0.014}** {0.071}*
N 16125 16125 15954 15954 15954 15954
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9,
or 10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient -0.094** -0.052* 0.003 -0.075 -0.107** -0.072*
of Years of (0.044) (0.027) (0.017) (0.050) (0.052) (0.041)
Schooling {0.022}** {0.032}** {0.920} {0.020}** {0.012}** {0.066}*
Reduced -0.034*** -0.018** 0.002 -0.026 -0.039*** -0.026**
Form (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012)
coefficient {0.075}* {0.100}* {0.806} {0.089}* {0.020}** {0.203}
N 16106 16106 16106 16106 16106 16106
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual
consults
horoscope at
least monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of
Years of Schooling
-0.058 -0.096 -0.209 -0.079
(0.058) (0.063) (0.285) (0.093)
{0.371} {0.145} {0.167} {0.442}
Reduced Form
coefficient
-0.025 -0.041* -0.074 -0.043
(0.023) (0.022) (0.050) (0.043)
{0.364} {0.143} {0.171} {0.442}
N 6874 6874 1663 1424
Please see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on
standard errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based
on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.6
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
With State-specific (Germany) Cohort Trends
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient -0.107** -0.086** -0.065 -0.081* -0.079 -0.047
of Years of (0.052) (0.042) (0.040) (0.046) (0.049) (0.037)
Schooling {0.018}** {0.067}* {0.087}* {0.014}** {0.032}** {0.074}*
Reduced -0.049*** -0.039*** -0.028* -0.035** -0.034* -0.021
Form (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015)
coefficient {0.015}** {0.067}* {0.168} {0.041}** {0.053}* {0.210}
N 16337 16337 16163 16163 16163 16163
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9,
or 10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient -0.034 -0.038 -0.012 -0.007 -0.039 -0.025
of Years of (0.030) (0.024) (0.017) (0.041) (0.035) (0.027)
Schooling {0.235} {0.072}* {0.346} {0.587} {0.326} {0.435}
Reduced -0.016 -0.017* -0.006 -0.004 -0.018 -0.011
Form (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011)
coefficient {0.250} {0.095}* {0.514} {0.802} {0.206} {0.426}
N 16323 16323 16323 16323 16323 16323
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual
consults
horoscope at
least monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of
Years of Schooling
-0.100** -0.115** -0.103* -0.086**
(0.048) (0.051) (0.058) (0.041)
{0.014}** {0.008}*** {0.122} {0.007}***
Reduced Form
coefficient
-0.054** -0.063*** -0.100** -0.097**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.044) (0.039)
{0.014}** {0.008}*** {0.128} {0.007}***
N 6969 6969 1650 1416
Please see text for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on standard errors
clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based on standard
errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.7
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
Specifications with State-specific Quadratic Age Trends
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient -0.119** -0.093** -0.070** -0.067* -0.065* -0.033
of Years of (0.052) (0.042) (0.034) (0.037) (0.040) (0.032)
Schooling {0.010}** {0.020}** {0.062}* {0.060}* {0.094}* {0.332}
Reduced -0.058*** -0.046*** -0.034** -0.032** -0.032* -0.016
Form (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
coefficient {0.011}** {0.022}** {0.062}* {0.051}* {0.081}* {0.324}
N 16337 16337 16163 16163 16163 16163
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9,
or 10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient -0.048 -0.040* -0.020 -0.019 -0.045 -0.031
of Years of (0.029) (0.024) (0.016) (0.038) (0.032) (0.026)
Schooling {0.076}* {0.029}** {0.258} {0.630} {0.132} {0.269}
Reduced -0.023* -0.020* -0.010 -0.009 -0.022 -0.015
Form (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012)
coefficient {0.084}* {0.032}** {0.267} {0.633} {0.128} {0.282}
N 16323 16323 16323 16323 16323 16323
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual
consults
horoscope at
least monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of
Years of Schooling
-0.062* -0.075* -0.048 -0.086*
(0.037) (0.039) (0.034) (0.049)
{0.097}* {0.044}** {0.417} {0.115}
Reduced Form
coefficient
-0.039* -0.047** -0.050 -0.102*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.038) (0.060)
{0.103} {0.048}** {0.433} {0.163}
N 6969 6969 1650 1416
Please see text for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on standard errors
clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based on standard
errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.8
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
Specifications with a 7-year Window around the Pivotal Cohorts
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least once
a month
...at least once
a week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient -0.119*** -0.071** -0.094** -0.100** -0.072* -0.060*
of Years of (0.046) (0.034) (0.042) (0.048) (0.043) (0.035)
Schooling {0.000}*** {0.104} {0.008}*** {0.000}*** {0.006}*** {0.063}*
-0.040*** -0.023** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.024** -0.019**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
{0.000}*** {0.080}* {0.046}** {0.030}** {0.034}** {0.041}**
N 27515 27515 27232 27232 27232 27232
Sample Mean 0.304 0.181 0.455 0.393 0.324 0.216
1st Stage F-test 15.138 15.138 14.249 14.249 14.249 14.249
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9, or
10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient -0.058* -0.050** -0.019 -0.029 -0.040 -0.056*
of Years of (0.031) (0.023) (0.016) (0.041) (0.033) (0.030)
Schooling {0.058}* {0.017}** {0.079}* {0.491} {0.186} {0.036}**
Reduced Form -0.020** -0.017** -0.006 -0.010 -0.013 -0.019**
coefficient (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009)
{0.197} {0.048}** {0.251} {0.550} {0.306} {0.170}
N 27490 27490 27490 27490 27490 27490
Sample Mean 0.186 0.083 0.042 0.385 0.259 0.155
1st Stage F-test 15.857 15.857 15.857 15.857 15.857 15.857
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The treatment group consists of individuals born up to 7 years after the first cohort potentially affected by an
education reform. The control group consists of those born up to 7 years before the pivotal cohort. With the
exception of France, the first potentially affected cohort is not included, because the extent of their exposure to an
education reform is unclear. Control characteristics include Age, Age Squared, Male, Ethnic Minority, City, Mother
Immigrant and Mother Working variables. The estimations use sampling weights and include survey year dummies,
survey country dummies and country-specific cohort trends.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on
standard errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based
on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.9
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
Placebo Reforms. Assumed Implementation: 2 Years Earlier than the Actual Reform
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient -0.093 -0.078 -0.059 -0.064 -0.064 -0.004
of Years of (0.063) (0.066) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046) (0.037)
Schooling {0.683} {0.870} {0.492} {0.502} {0.404} {0.767}
Reduced -0.002 0.008 -0.024 -0.032* -0.015 -0.021
Form (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015)
coefficient {0.897} {0.705} {0.438} {0.333} {0.589} {0.329}
N 15883 15883 15719 15719 15719 15719
1st Stage F-test 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9,
or 10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient -0.045 -0.014 0.018 -0.091 -0.023 -0.046
of Years of (0.051) (0.036) (0.029) (0.075) (0.053) (0.048)
Schooling {0.146} {0.101} {0.924} {0.228} {0.221} {0.087}*
Reduced -0.008 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.016 -0.006
Form (0.015) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
coefficient {0.796} {0.831} {0.652} {0.995} {0.552} {0.875}
N 15869 15869 15869 15869 15869 15869
1st Stage F-test 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual
consults
horoscope at
least monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of
Years of Schooling
0.085 0.152 0.363 0.088
(0.196) (0.253) (0.509) (0.853)
{0.605} {0.348} {0.044}** {0.911}
Reduced Form
coefficient
-0.012 -0.021 -0.102** -0.005
(0.024) (0.025) (0.048) (0.031)
{0.610} {0.355} {0.063}* {0.927}
N 6713 6713 1567 1328
1st Stage F-test 0.676 0.676 0.574 0.018
Please see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on
standard errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based
on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.10
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
Placebo Reforms. Assumed Implementation: 2 Years Later than the Actual Reform
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient 0.223 -0.099 -0.474 -0.455 -0.076 0.141
of Years of (0.799) (0.371) (1.945) (1.889) (0.474) (0.818)
Schooling {0.541} {0.245} {0.116} {0.090}* {0.105} {0.866}
Reduced -0.007 0.008 0.020 0.019 0.007 -0.002
Form (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
coefficient {0.711} {0.547} {0.207} {0.223} {0.537} {0.828}
N 16640 16640 16448 16448 16448 16448
1st Stage F-test 0.183 0.183 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9,
or 10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient 1.052 0.996 0.172 2.109 1.937 2.067
of Years of (11.602) (11.022) (2.022) (23.381) (21.402) (22.564)
Schooling {0.667} {0.785} {0.999} {0.533} {0.377} {0.489}
Reduced -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 -0.018 -0.018 -0.020
Form (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
coefficient {0.577} {0.514} {0.957} {0.288} {0.236} {0.274}
N 16617 16617 16617 16617 16617 16617
1st Stage F-test 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual
consults
horoscope at
least monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of
Years of Schooling
-0.536 -0.656 0.062 -0.113
(1.548) (1.878) (0.153) (0.270)
{0.067}* {0.019}** {0.681} {0.405}
Reduced Form
coefficient
-0.033 -0.040* 0.018 -0.024
(0.022) (0.023) (0.040) (0.041)
{0.065}* {0.020}** {0.687} {0.481}
N 7200 7200 1727 1484
1st Stage F-test 0.108 0.108 0.584 0.229
Please see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on
standard errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based
on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.11
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
Placebo Reforms. Assumed Implementation: 3 Years Earlier than the Actual Reform
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient -0.055 -0.014 -0.002 0.027 -0.028 -0.007
of Years of (0.077) (0.057) (0.068) (0.076) (0.068) (0.053)
Schooling {0.410} {0.814} {0.393} {0.211} {0.491} {0.544}
Reduced 0.015 0.005 0.001 -0.006 0.008 0.002
Form (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013)
coefficient {0.464} {0.967} {0.902} {0.712} {0.638} {0.616}
N 15496 15496 15357 15357 15357 15357
1st Stage F-test 1.855 1.855 1.732 1.732 1.732 1.732
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9,
or 10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient 0.018 -0.080 -0.042 0.071 0.011 0.064
of Years of (0.055) (0.058) (0.038) (0.080) (0.061) (0.067)
Schooling {0.648 {0.050}** {0.195} {0.706} {0.539} {0.851}
Reduced -0.006 0.021* 0.011 -0.021 -0.004 -0.018
Form (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013)
coefficient {0.685} {0.315} {0.310} {0.411} {0.743} {0.277}
N 15495 15495 15495 15495 15495 15495
1st Stage F-test 1.908 1.908 1.908 1.908 1.908 1.908
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual
consults
horoscope at
least monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of
Years of Schooling
-0.003 -0.121 0.134 -0.388
(0.223) (0.279) (0.221) (0.520)
{0.984} {0.451} {0.634} {0.049}**
Reduced Form
coefficient
0.000 0.013 -0.043 0.104**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.048) (0.044)
{0.985} {0.457} {0.632} {0.076}*
N 6619 6619 1562 1316
1st Stage F-test 0.415 0.415 0.777 0.541
Please see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on
standard errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based
on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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Table A.12
The Impact of Education on Religiosity and Superstition
Placebo Reforms. Assumed Implementation: 3 Years Later than the Actual Reform
Panel A: Frequency of Attending Religious Services and Praying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attend religious services (apart
from special occasions) … Pray (apart from religious services) …
... at least
once a month
...at least once a
week
... at least
once a
month
... at least
once a
week
... several
times a
week
... every
day
IV coefficient 0.031 -0.193 0.075 -0.065 -0.199 -0.122
of Years of (0.184) (0.238) (0.307) (0.249) (0.411) (0.282)
Schooling {0.933} {0.224} {0.290} {0.392} {0.499} {0.642}
Reduced -0.005 0.020 -0.004 0.006 0.016 0.007
Form (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014)
coefficient {0.663} {0.426} {0.746} {0.915} {0.773} {0.860}
N 16893 16893 16683 16683 16683 16683
1st Stage F-test 0.649 0.649 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520
Panel B: Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On a scale from 0 to 10 person’s
religiosity
Belongs to … of religiosity distribution in the
country
... is 8, 9,
or 10
... is 9 or 10 ... is 10 top 30% top 20% top 10%
IV coefficient -0.098 -0.020 -0.011 0.031 -0.027 -0.087
of Years of (0.151) (0.076) (0.063) (0.192) (0.169) (0.134)
Schooling {0.845} {0.960} {0.916} {0.612} {0.815} {0.832}
Reduced 0.010 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.009
Form (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012)
coefficient {0.850} {0.742} {0.753} {0.585} {0.786} {0.920}
N 16876 16876 16876 16876 16876 16876
1st Stage F-test 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651
Panel C: Superstition
On a scale from 1 to 10 person’s
belief that lucky charm protects …
Individual
consults
horoscope at
least monthly
Individual takes into
account horoscope in
daily life sometimes,
most of the time, or
always
… is ≥ 4 … is ≥ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV coefficient of
Years of Schooling
0.001 -0.046 -0.925 -0.089
(0.271) (0.271) (3.274) (0.209)
{1.000} {0.872} {0.091}* {0.563}
Reduced Form
coefficient
-0.000 0.004 0.083* 0.020
(0.022) (0.022) (0.047) (0.039)
{1.000} {0.878} {0.093}* {0.612}
N 7217 7217 1785 1535
1st Stage F-test 0.193 0.193 0.082 0.342
Please see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for the specification details. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are based on
standard errors clustered at the regional level, which are reported in parentheses. The bootstrapped p-values based
on standard errors clustered at the country/state level are reported in {curly brackets}.
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APPENDIX B: EDUCATION REFORMS IN EUROPE
Austria:
In 1962, a federal education act increased the length of compulsory education from 8 to 9 years. According
to Fort et al. (2011), the law came into effect on September 1 in 1966. School in Austria started at age 6 and,
according to Fort et al. (2011), the cut-off date for school-entry was mostly September 1. This means that the first
potentially affected pupils were those born in September-December 1951. On the other hand, Gathmann et al. (2014)
code the first potentially affected cohort as those born in 1952. Since most of the individuals born in 1951 were not
exposed to the reform, this chapter follows Gathmann et al. (2014) and codes those born in 1952 as the pivotal
cohort, which is omitted from the regressions. People born in 1951 and earlier form the control group. Those born in
1953 or later were exposed to 9 years of compulsory education and form the treatment group.
Note: Brunello et al. (2009, 2013) suggest that the reform was both passed and implemented in 1962. Brunello et al.
(2009, 2013) code the first potentially affected cohort as those born in 1947, because  “the individuals born in 1947
who might have already left school when the reform was introduced were required to go back to school and
complete the additional year.”
Belgium:
The literature reports that in June 1983 the length of compulsory schooling was increased from 8 to 12
years (Brunello et al. 2009, Murtin and Viarengo 2011, Garrouste 2010). The mandate obliged students to stay in
school until they were 18 years old, although the final two or three years could be completed part-time. School in
Belgium started at age 6, which means that the students aged 14 in 1983 were the first cohort potentially affected by
the reform. These people were born in 1969, and I omit them from the regressions. People born in 1968 or earlier
form the treatment group, while those born in 1970 or later form the control group.
Denmark:
The literature reports two compulsory schooling extensions in Denmark in the second half of the 20th
century (Brunello et al. 2009, Fort et al. 2011, Gathmann et al. 2014, Murtin and Viarengo 2011, Garrouste 2010).
First, in 1958 the length of compulsory education was increased from 4 to 7 years. Then in 1971 it was further
extended from 7 to 9 years. I only use the second reform. Those born in 1956 or earlier form the control group,
while the treatment group is composed of respondents born in 1958 or later.
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Note: Gathmann et al. (2014) state that the reform was implemented in 1972, but they still code the first potentially
affected cohort as those born in 1957.
France:
During the 20th century, compulsory schooling in France was extended twice: from 7 to 8 years in 1936 (the
Zay reform) and from 8 to 10 years in 1959 (Berthoin reform). I only use the second reform. This reform was
implemented in 1967, increased the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 16 and affected all those born on
January 1, 1953 or later. Thus, people who were born in 1952 or earlier were not exposed to the mandate and form
the treatment group. Respondents born in 1953 or later form the control group.
Sources: Brunello et al. (2009), Fort et al. (2011), Gathmann et al. (2014), Murtin and Viarengo (2011), and Grenet
(2013).
Germany:
The former Federal Republic of Germany increased the length of compulsory schooling from 8 to 9 years.
The reform was implemented gradually across the 10 German states. Hamburg was the first state to implement the
reform in 1949. The last state to implement the reform was Bayern in 1969. I borrow the coding of the reforms
Pischke and Wachter (2005), published as Pischke and Wachter (2008). I use the reforms for 9 states, because the
first cohort affected by the reform in Hamburg was born in 1935 and is outside of the age range of my sample.
Greece:
In 1976, the Greek Parliament increased years of compulsory education from 6 to 9 years (Law 309/1976).
Since the starting school age is 6, the first potentially affected individuals are those were 12 in 1976 and were born
in 1964. While Brunello et al. (2009, 2013) state that the date of the law is 1975, Murtin and Viarengo (2011),
Garrouste (2010), and Kazamias (1978) all report that the law was passed in 1976. I code people born in 1965 or
later as part of the treatment group and those born in 1963 or earlier as part of the control group. The extent of
exposure of the 1964 cohort is unclear, and this cohort is omitted from the models.
Hungary:
In 1961, the length of compulsory education was increased from 8 to 10 years, with the corresponding
increase in the minimum legal school leaving age from 14 to 16 (Borgonovi et al. 2010). People born in 1948 or
later form the treatment group, while those born in 1946 or earlier belong to the control group. The extent of
exposure of the 1947 cohort is unclear, and this cohort is omitted from the models.
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Note: The information on this reform comes only from Borgonovi et al. (2010). Both Garrouste (2010) and Eurydice
(2004/05) mention the Act III on Education of 1961, but no information on the increase of compulsory schooling
years is available in these sources.
Ireland:
In 1972, the minimum school leaving age was increased from 14 to 15. For this reform, respondents born in
1959 or later form the treatment group, while those born in 1957 or earlier belong to the control group. The extent of
exposure of the 1958 cohort is unclear, and this cohort is omitted from the models.
Sources: Brunello et al. (2009), Fort (2006), Garrouste (2010), Murtin and Viarengo (2011), Gathmann (2014).
Italy:
Reform that made junior high school compulsory was passed at the end of 1962 and implemented in 1963.
The mandate increased the years of compulsory schooling from 5 to 8 and minimum legal school leaving age from
11 to 14. Both Brunello et al. (2009) and Gathmann (2014) refer to Brandolini and Cipollone (2002) and code those
being born in 1949 as the first cohort affected by the reform. This is at odds with the straightforward calculation
1963-11=1952.
Fort (2006) gives two other cut-offs: “According to [Brandolini and Cipollone, 2002, pp. 12], people
potentially affected by the reform are those who in 1963 were less than 15 years old and without middle school
degree, those who were between 6 and 14 years old in 1963, that is those born between 1949-1957. Instead, [Flabbi,
1999, pp. 13] claimed that the reform starts “to be effective on people born after the 1950.”
In addition, several papers point out that the compliance with the reform may have been imperfect:
Brunello et al. (2009): “Compliance with the reform was not immediate and only in 1976 the proportion of
children attending junior high school approached 100%.”
Brandolini and Cipollone (2002 Bank of Italy working paper) use 1949-1956 range for the omitted cohort
and state the following: “Notwithstanding this initial success of the reform it took almost additional 15 years for the
enrolment rate in the third class of junior high school to approach 100 per cent.”
Bratti and Braga (2013 working paper): “Enforcement of the law was far from being perfect initially, and
improved gradually, although it is necessary to wait until the mid `70s to observe full compliance with the new
school obligation.”
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I follow d’Hombres and Nunziata (2015) and Bratti and Braga (2013) and code the first potentially affected
cohort as those born in 1950. People born in 1949 or earlier form the control group, while those born in 1951 or later
form the treatment group.
Poland:
In 1961 the length of compulsory education was increased from 7 to 8 years, with the corresponding
increase in the minimum legal school leaving age from 14 to 15 (Borgonovi et al. 2010). Additional information is
provided by the International Education Guide (2012): “Primary school was extended to 8 years following the
introduction of the 1961 Education System Development Act (Ustawa o rozwoju systemu oswiaty i wychowania).
Compulsory education covered Grades 1 to 8 (ages 7 to 15).” According to Joanna Jung-Miklaszewska (2003), the
8th grade (Form VIII) was organized in the school year 1966/67. This made those born in 1953 or later to be fully
exposed to the reform, while those born in 1951 or earlier missed the mandate. It is uncertain whether the
respondents born in 1952 were exposed to the reform; therefore, this cohort is omitted from the estimations.
Portugal:
The 1964 reform in Portugal increased the level of compulsory schooling from 4 to 6 years, raising the
minimum school leaving age to 14. The reform applied to those who entered school from 1964 onwards, i.e. those
born in 1956 and later. Thus, people born in 1955 or earlier form the control group, while those born in 1957 or later
form the treatment group.
Portugal has also extended the length of compulsory schooling from 3 to 4 years in 1956 (for boys) and in
1960 (for girls).  To avoid the potentially confounding effect of this reform, I narrow the window around the pivotal
cohort to 3 years for girls.  Dropping Portugal from the analysis had no impact on the results.
Sources: Brunello et al. (2013), Fort (2006), Garrouste (2010), Pereira and Martins (2002), Sousa et al.
(2015), Vieira (1999).
Spain:
In 1970, the General Act on Education and Financing of Educational Reform increased years of
compulsory schooling from 6 to 8 and the minimum legal school leaving age from 12 to 14 (Brunello et al. 2009,
Fort 2006, Garrouste 2010, Gathmann et al. 2014). Both Brunello et al. (2009) and Gathmann et al. (2014) follow
Pons and Gonzalo (2002) and code those born in 1957 as the first cohort potentially affected by the reform. These
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respondents 13 years old in 1970. I follow this approach and assign people who were born before 1957 to the control
group and people who were born after 1957 to the treatment group.
Sweden:
In 1962, Sweden increased its years of compulsory schooling from 8 to 9 (Brunello et al. 2009, Fort 2006,
Murtin and Viarengo 2011). However, the full implementation of this reform was preceded by a period of
experimental gradual implementation at the municipality level, which started in 1949 (Meghir and Palme 2005).
The gradual implementation of the reform makes it difficult to clearly isolate the cohorts impacted by the
change. I follow Borgonovi et al. (2010) and d’Hombres and Nunziata (2015) and code the first potentially affected
cohort as those born in 1951. People born in 1950 or earlier form the control group, while those born in 1952 or later
form the treatment group.
The United Kingdom:
In March 1972, the minimum school leaving age was increased from 15 to 16, starting September 1 1972
(www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1972/444/pdfs/uksi_19720444_en.pdf). School started at age 5, which implies that the
number of years of compulsory education increased from 10 to 11. In Northern Ireland, the reform of 1972 also
increased the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16.
The mandate affected all individuals born September 1957 or later in England, Wales, and Northern
Ireland. However, the extent of the exposure of the 1957 cohort to the reform in not known. This cohort is excluded
from the analysis. Respondents born in 1958 or later form the treatment group, while people born in 1956 or earlier
form the control group.
For Scotland, several papers report 1976 as the date of the reform (Fort 2006, Gathmann et al. 2014,
Brunello et al. 2013). However, Gathmann et al. (2014) and Fort (2006) suggest those born in 1958 as the first
potentially affected cohort. I code people born in 1959 as the first fully affected cohort in Scotland. Those born 1957
or earlier form the control group, while people born in 1958 are excluded from the models.
In 1940s, the United Kingdom had another education reform that increased the minimum legal school
leaving age from 14 to 15. However, the first cohort exposed to that mandate was born in 1930s. In order to avoid
potentially confounding effects of ageing on religiosity, my sample is restricted to those 65 years old or younger,
which prevents the usage of this early reform.
93
Sources: Brunello et al. (2009), Brunello et al. (2013), Fort (2006), Fort et al. (2011), Murtin and Viarengo (2011),
Clark and Royer (2013), Oreopolous (2006, 2007), Gathmann (2014).
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APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA DOCUMENTATION FOR CHAPTER 2
ESS Religious Denominations
Respondents in the ESS were asked whether they belong to a religious denomination and, if so, to which
denomination they belong. Possible answers included 1 “Roman Catholic,” 2 “Protestant,” 3 “Eastern Orthodox,” 4
“Other Christian denomination,” 5 “Jewish,” 6 “Islamic,” 7 “Eastern religions,” and 8 “Other non-Christian
religions.” However, there were inconsistencies in the religious denomination reporting in the ESS data. First, in
Round 2 of the ESS, for Hungarian respondents the category “Eastern Orthodox” was merged with the category
“Roman Catholic.” Second, for respondents from France in Rounds 1 and 2, the category “Other Christian
denomination” was merged with the category “Other non-Christian religions.” Third, in the United Kingdom in
Rounds 2 and 3, many interviewers appear not to have probed respondents sufficiently if the respondents simply
reported their religion as being “Christian.” Rather than asking for more details about the Christian denomination to
which the respondent felt they belonged, the interviewer instead used the “Other Christian denomination” category.
This resulted in significantly larger proportions of people reporting belonging to “Other Christian denomination”
when compared to other ESS rounds of the United Kingdom data (Rounds 1, 4, 5, and 6). These inconsistencies
prevented the creation of a uniform religious denomination variable with fine subcategories. The final denomination
variable has categories 1 “No denomination,” 2 “Christian,” and 3 “Non-Christian.”
EVS Superstition Measures:
“Do you believe that a lucky charm such as a mascot or a talisman can protect or help you?” question was
asked in the 1999 wave and the 2008 wave. The possible answers range from 1 “Definitely not” to 10 “Definitely
yes.” For specifications in Table 6, this variable is converted into two dichotomous indicators taking the values of
one if the respondent’s belief in lucky charm is, respectively, greater than or equal to 4, or greater than or equal to 5.
This question was asked in all of the countries already present in the religiosity analysis. The list of countries in the
“lucky charm” sample consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Northern Ireland51, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and West Germany.
51 In the EVS data, Northern Ireland enters as a separate country. This is in contrast to the ESS, where survey design
treats Northern Ireland region as a part of Great Britain (Rounds 1 to 6) or a part of Ireland (Round 4 only). I created
a new country “Northern Ireland” in the ESS data when harmonizing the region variable across rounds. Northern
Ireland has a separate country fixed effect in the regressions, but is not present in the graphs, since the number of
observations is small.
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Two questions about horoscope were asked in the 1999 wave: “How often do you consult your horoscope
to know about your future?”52 and “How often do you take this into account in your daily life”53 The variable “How
often do you consult your horoscope?” is converted into a dummy variable taking the value of one if the respondent
reports consulting with the horoscope at least once a month, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the variable “How often
do you take horoscope into account in daily life?” is converted into an indicator taking the value of one if the
respondent reports taking horoscope into account at least sometimes, and zero otherwise. The questions about
horoscope were asked in four countries, for which the education reforms information is available: Austria, France,
Greece, Italy and West Germany. These countries compose the “horoscope” sample.
EVS Sample and the Education Measure:
The sample is restricted to individuals younger than 65 years old, citizens of the country of interview and
non-students. In addition, to keep the EVS sample more comparable to the ESS sample, immigrants were dropped
whenever the information on whether the individual was born in the country is available (the 2008 wave only).
The number of years of education in the ESS is approximated by subtracting the country school starting age
(6 for most countries, 5 for Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 7 for Denmark, Poland and Sweden) from the age of
education completion as reported by the respondent. Observations for which the current reported age is less than the
reported age of completing education are dropped. In addition, observations with calculated years of education
greater than 25 are dropped as well.
EVS Control Variables:
Unlike the ESS, the EVS does not ask its respondents about their self-perceived urbanicity. However, the
actual size of the town, in which the interview was conducted, is available starting in the 1990 wave. The possible
categories of this variable are “under 2,000,” “2,000-5,000,” “5,000-10,000” “10,000-20,000,” “20,000-50,000,”
“50,000-100,000,” “100,000-500,000,” “500,000+.” Approximately 50% of respondents in the original data lived in
towns under 20,000. The variable city takes the value of one if the size of the town of the interview is 20,000 or
more, and zero otherwise.
52The full set of possible answers includes 1 “Every day,” 2 “At least once a week,” 3 “At least once a month,” 4
“Less often,” and 5 “Never.”
53 The full set of possible answers includes 1 “Always,” 2 “Most of the time,” 3 “Sometimes,” 4 “Not very often,”
and 5 “Never.”
96
APPENDIX D: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3
Table D.1
Measures of Culture of Leisure in the Countries of Origin
Country
Leisure
Important
(1 “Not at all”
to 4 “Very
important”)
People Turn
Lazy
(1 “Strongly
agree” to  5
“Strongly
disagree”)
Work is a Duty
to Society
(1 “Strongly
agree” to  5
“Strongly
disagree”)
Work Should
Come First
(1 “Strongly
agree” to  5
“Strongly
disagree”)
Generous
Holidays are
Important
(0 to 100)
Algeria 2.953 20.515
Austria 3.251 2.141 2.078 2.556 20.708
Belarus 3.006 2.175 2.353 3.089 39.322
Belgium 3.255 2.667 2.302 3.179 28.246
Brazil 3.297 2.163 2.131 2.395 16.107
Bulgaria 2.955 2.036 2.121 2.219 37.069
Canada 3.280 2.671 2.392 3.028 26.680
Chile 3.213 2.117 2.106 2.534 26.159
China 2.571 2.039 2.084 2.234 13.701
Croatia 3.109 2.464 2.598 2.816 33.549
Cyprus 3.470 1.954 1.911 2.228 39.550
Czech Republic 3.020 2.112 2.453 2.604 25.070
Denmark 3.391 2.322 2.119 2.777 18.842
Egypt 2.554 1.548 1.418 1.431 12.900
Estonia 2.996 2.289 2.534 2.902 30.144
Ethiopia 3.275 1.736 1.639 1.636
Finland 3.343 2.521 2.422 3.090 14.920
France 3.195 2.609 2.378 3.182 15.553
Georgia 3.184 2.004 2.123 1.975 23.132
Germany 3.177 2.580 2.290 2.487 24.623
Greece 3.361 2.325 2.485 2.760 24.982
Hungary 3.123 1.988 2.192 2.172 34.146
India 2.599 1.861 1.946 2.084 39.353
Indonesia 2.817 1.975 2.507 2.003 29.980
Iran 3.038 37.480
Iraq 2.933
Ireland 3.271 2.563 2.380 3.012 38.054
Italy 3.108 2.077 2.198 2.701 23.574
Latvia 2.866 2.189 2.535 2.974 27.232
Macedonia 3.405 2.076 2.257 2.223 33.774
Morocco 2.916 1.794 1.494 1.565 77.658
Netherlands 3.467 2.984 2.419 3.439 36.185
Norway 3.388 2.546 1.854 2.838 11.825
Pakistan 2.246
Poland 3.119 2.134 2.371 2.609 31.796
Portugal 3.041 2.160 1.910 2.647 49.582
Romania 2.975 1.848 2.162 2.071 45.499
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Table D.1 (Continued)
Country
Leisure
Important
(1 “Not at all”
to 4 “Very
important”)
People Turn
Lazy
(1 “Strongly
agree” to  5
“Strongly
disagree”)
Work is a Duty
to Society
(1 “Strongly
agree” to  5
“Strongly
disagree”)
Work Should
Come First
(1 “Strongly
agree” to  5
“Strongly
disagree”)
Generous
Holidays are
Important
(0 to 100)
Russia 2.968 2.139 2.662 2.686 37.635
Slovak Republic 3.088 1.939 2.336 2.369 28.923
Spain 3.221 2.318 2.382 2.725 30.524
Sweden 3.487 2.988 2.449 3.165 21.012
Switzerland 3.346 2.662 2.267 2.869 18.506
Turkey 3.176 1.706 1.762 2.115 50.846
Ukraine 2.975 2.135 2.550 2.709 39.890
United Kingdom 3.373 2.734 2.483 3.223 29.204
United States 3.297 2.566 2.502 3.111 31.466
Vietnam 2.573 1.840 1.666 2.079 42.000
N 47 43 43 43 44
Mean 3.099 2.226 2.214 2.570 30.407
St. Dev. (0.271) (0.340) (0.302) (0.480) (12.184)
Table D.2
Descriptive Statistics for the Labor Force Participation Sample
Females Males
Variable Description (Source)
Average
Tax
sample
τ sample
Average
Tax
sample
τ sample
Panel A: Personal Characteristics
Labor Force
   Participation
==1 if the individual reported being
engaged in any paid work in the last 7
days or has “Unemployed and actively
looking for a job” marked as his or her
main activity in the last week, 0
otherwise
0.682 0.678 0.780 0.777
(0.466) (0.467) (0.414) (0.416)
Age Age of the respondent
39.971 39.314 38.103 37.956
(13.587) (13.875) (13.758) (13.925)
Ethnic Minority ==1 if the respondent belongs tominority ethnic group in a country
0.133 0.106 0.156 0.122
(0.340) (0.308) (0.363) (0.327)
Years of
   Schooling
Number of years of full-time education
completed
13.267 13.025 13.000 12.969
(3.524) (3.708) (3.468) (3.577)
Married ==1 if the respondent is married, 0
otherwise
0.507 0.457 0.471 0.434
(0.500) (0.498) (0.499) (0.496)
City ==1 if respondent lives in a big city, 0otherwise
0.326 0.217 0.304 0.226
(0.469) (0.412) (0.460) (0.418)
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Table D.2 (Continued)
Females Males
Variable Description (Source)
Average
Tax
sample
τ sample
Average
Tax
sample
τ sample
Panel B: Culture of Leisure in Country of Origin
Leisure
   Important
Average country response to the
question “For each of the following
aspects, indicate how important it is in
your life. Leisure time: 1 ‘Not at all
important’ to 4 ‘Very important’” (A)
3.077 3.116 3.081 3.112
(0.191) (0.201) (0.183) (0.189)
Generous
   Holidays
Average country response to the
question “Here are some more aspects
of a job that people say are important.
Please look at them and tell me which
ones you personally think are important
in a job. Generous holidays” (A)
34.912 31.656 34.770 32.302
(15.211) (13.687) (15.132) (13.971)
People Turn
Lazy
Average country response to the
question “Do you agree or disagree
with the following statements: People
who don't work turn lazy. 1 ‘Strongly
agree’ 2 ‘Agree’ 3 ‘Neither agree nor
disagree’ 4 ‘Disagree’ 5 ‘Strongly
disagree’” (A)
2.177 2.225 2.175 2.210
(0.310) (0.325) (0.306) (0.323)
Work Is a Duty
   to Society
Average country response to the
question “Do you agree or disagree
with the following statements: Work is
a duty towards society. 1 ‘Strongly
agree’ 2 ‘Agree’ 3 ‘Neither agree nor
disagree’ 4 ‘Disagree’ 5 ‘Strongly
disagree’” (A)
2.251 2.238 2.242 2.221
(0.330) (0.266) (0.334) (0.279)
Work Should
   Come First
Average country response to the
question “Do you agree or disagree
with the following statements: Work
should always come first, even if it
means less spare time. 1 ‘Strongly
agree’ 2 ‘Agree’ 3 ‘Neither agree nor
disagree’ 4 ‘Disagree’ 5 ‘Strongly
disagree’” (A)
2.535 2.586 2.541 2.576
(0.452) (0.414) (0.441) (0.416)
Labor Force
   Participation
Gender and age group-specific labor
force participation in the country of
origin (I)
54.866 57.171 76.593 75.628
(23.292) (22.891) (20.485) (20.805)
Panel C: Other Country of Origin Characteristics
Per Capita
   Income
PPP adjusted GDP per capita in
constant 2011 US$ (D)
24,771 28,242 24,995 27,791
(12,945) (13,360) (12,930) (13,196)
Ethnolinguistic
  Fragmentation
Roeder's 1985 Index of the extent of
ethnolinguistic fragmentation in the
country (B)
0.276 0.245 0.275 0.246
(0.195) (0.200) (0.192) (0.198)
Democratic
Number of years in which the country
experienced democracy between 1930
and 1995 (C)
22.448 29.569 23.500 29.466
(24.853) (25.579) (24.842) (25.332)
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Table D.2 (Continued)
Females Males
Variable Description (Source)
Average
Tax
sample
τ sample
Average
Tax
sample
τ sample
British Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home
country is English Common Law, 0
otherwise (C)
0.096 0.123 0.098 0.124
(0.295) (0.328) (0.297) (0.329)
French Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home
country is French Commercial Code, 0
otherwise (C)
0.393 0.430 0.422 0.459
(0.488) (0.495) (0.494) (0.499)
Socialist/Comm.
   Legal Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home
country is Socialist/Communist Laws,
0 otherwise (C)
0.384 0.270 0.353 0.256
(0.486) (0.444) (0.478) (0.437)
German Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home
country is German Commercial Code,
0 otherwise (C)
0.084 0.119 0.088 0.113
(0.277) (0.324) (0.284) (0.317)
Scandinavian
   Legal Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home
country is Scandinavian Commercial
Code, 0 otherwise (C)
0.044 0.058 0.039 0.048
(0.205) (0.233) (0.193) (0.213)
% Catholic 1980 % Catholic in a country in 1980 (C)
32.551 44.392 33.474 43.948
(36.536) (36.952) (36.980) (37.216)
% Muslim 1980 % Muslim in a country in 1980 (C)
22.851 17.908 22.996 19.535
(38.687) (36.176) (38.684) (37.598)
% Protestant
   1980 % Protestant in a country in 1980 (C)
10.655 13.553 9.966 12.290
(21.976) (24.059) (21.275) (22.910)
% Other
   Denomin. 1980
% Other Denomination in a country in
1980 (C)
33.943 24.148 33.564 24.227
(34.599) (26.473) (34.646) (26.979)
Panel D: Country of Destination Characteristics
Average Tax
   Rate
Average personal income tax and
social security contribution rate on
gross labor income for a single person
without a dependent (G)
25.639 26.425
(8.469) (8.768)
߬
The effective marginal tax rate
calculated using McDaniel data (H)
48.737 48.947
(9.383) (9.338)
Unemployment
   Rate Country unemployment rate (D)
7.595 7.051 7.646 7.234
(3.236) (2.961) (3.187) (2.963)
Per Capita
   Income
PPP adjusted GDP per capita in
constant 2011 US$ (D)
36,435 39,997 37,416 40,139
(11,805) (9,123) (12,933) (9,313)
Average Country
   Education
Average education of individuals aged
15 and over in the country (E)
11.570 11.330 11.530 11.351
(0.955) (1.009) (0.946) (0.961)
Population Country population in millions (D)
20.094 29.579 22.054 31.619
(25.873) (29.332) (27.504) (30.255)
Individualism
Hofstede Index of the degree to which
individuals are integrated into groups
(F)
63.363 67.420 64.218 67.961
(12.014) (13.274) (11.349) (11.841)
Ethnolinguistic
   Fragmentation
Roeder's 1985 Index of the extent of
ethnolinguistic fragmentation in the
country (B)
0.311 0.284 0.315 0.288
(0.180) (0.195) (0.187) (0.201)
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Table D.2 (Continued)
Females Males
Variable Description (Source)
Average
Tax
sample
τ sample
Average
Tax
sample
τ sample
Democratic Number of years in which the countryexperienced democracy between 1930
and 1995 (C)
43.202 50.135 44.124 51.170
(24.351) (22.507) (24.547) (21.718)
British Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home
country is English Common Law, 0
otherwise (C)
0.272 0.098 0.226 0.091
(0.445) (0.297) (0.418) (0.288)
French Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home
country is French Commercial Code, 0
otherwise (C)
0.215 0.319 0.241 0.326
(0.411) (0.466) (0.428) (0.469)
Socialist/Comm.
   Legal Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home
country is Socialist/Communist Laws,
0 otherwise (C)
0.235 0.155 0.232 0.143
(0.424) (0.362) (0.422) (0.351)
German Legal
   Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home
country is German Commercial Code,
0 otherwise (C)
0.185 0.307 0.203 0.322
(0.388) (0.461) (0.402) (0.467)
Scandinavian
   Legal Origin
==1 if the legal origin of home
country is Scandinavian Commercial
Code, 0 otherwise (C)
0.093 0.122 0.098 0.118
(0.291) (0.327) (0.298) (0.323)
% Catholic 1980 % Catholic in a country in 1980 (C)
34.053 50.908 36.545 51.646
(35.189) (30.644) (35.475) (30.574)
% Muslim 1980 % Muslim in a country in 1980 (C)
2.512 0.801 2.257 0.806
(7.016) (0.952) (7.334) (0.983)
% Protestant
   1980 % Protestant in a country in 1980 (C)
26.788 26.961 28.012 26.991
(29.941) (28.024) (30.311) (28.473)
% Other
   Denomin. 1980
% Other Denomination in a country in
1980 (C)
36.647 21.330 33.187 20.557
(32.754) (21.558) (31.047) (20.852)
N 3770 2204 3295 2022
Personal characteristics variables data come from the ESS survey and cover years from 2004 to 2013. The sample
is restricted to second-generation immigrants between 16 and 64 years of age. Survey weights are used.
߬ sample includes the following countries of destination: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Average Tax Rate sample includes the following
additional countries of destination: Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, and Turkey.
A: World Values Survey and European Values Study data. The original variable Leisure Important had reverse
scale; it was recoded so that higher values correspond to “lazier” culture.
B: Philip G. Roeder, 2001. “Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985”
<http://pages.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm>; C: Teorell, Jan, Nicholas Charron, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg,
Bo Rothstein, Petrus Sundin and Richard Svensson, 2013. “The Quality of Government Dataset” version
qog_std_cs_20dec13 <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>; D: World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database
<http://databank.worldbank.org /data/databases.aspx>; E: Barro and Lee data set version BL2013_MF1599_v2.0
<http://www.barrolee.com/data/full1.htm>. The variable is available for the years 2000, 2005, and 2010; the
values in between are interpolated; years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 are assigned the 2010 value; F: Hofstede, G.
“Cultural Dimensions” <http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html>. G: OECD Tax Database Table 5
<http://stats.oecd.org.libezp.lib.lsu.edu/index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE_I5#>; H:
<http://www.caramcdaniel.com/researchpapers>; I: International Labor Organization ILOSTAT Database annual
gender-and-age-group-specific indicator, averaged over the period since year 2002. The following bands were
used for the age groups: 15-24, 25-54, and 55-64.
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Table D.3
 Models of Table 3.5 column (1) and Table 3.6 column (1): Reporting All Coefficients
Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LFP Weekly Hours LFP Weekly Hours
Average Tax -0.004*** -0.083* -0.003** 2.302
(0.001) (0.042) (0.001) (2.140)
Leisure Important -0.133*** 0.892 0.020 -0.092**
(0.029) (1.843) (0.045) (0.043)
Personal
   Characteristics
Age 0.081*** 0.430** 0.093*** 0.842***
(0.004) (0.160) (0.003) (0.121)
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.004** -0.001*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Ethnic Minority 0.016 0.247 0.016 -0.700
(0.020) (0.659) (0.022) (0.638)
Years of Schooling 0.012*** 0.241*** 0.001 0.107
(0.002) (0.069) (0.003) (0.064)
Married -0.089*** -1.799*** 0.029** 1.163*
(0.016) (0.528) (0.015) (0.640)
City 0.022 -0.094 -0.018 -1.598***
(0.018) (0.559) (0.019) (0.424)
Country of Origin
   Characteristics
Per Capita Income 0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ethnolinguistic 0.054 -1.582 0.044 -0.089
Fragmentation (0.037) (1.635) (0.028) (1.577)
Democratic 0.001 -0.037 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.034) (0.001) (0.031)
French Legal Origin 0.072* -0.088 0.008 1.376
(0.037) (1.100) (0.027) (1.118)
Socialist/Communist 0.131** -3.057 0.041 2.610
Legal Origin (0.049) (2.006) (0.039) (2.047)
German Legal Origin 0.047 -0.416 -0.021 2.988**
(0.038) (1.214) (0.024) (1.262)
Scandinavian Legal 0.112** 2.360 -0.050 -0.596
Origin (0.055) (1.912) (0.039) (2.270)
% Catholic 1980 0.000 -0.031*** 0.001** -0.001
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.015)
% Muslim 1980 0.001*** -0.038** 0.000 0.022
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.019)
% Protestant 1980 -0.000 -0.047** 0.001*** 0.026
(0.001) (0.022) (0.000) (0.026)
Country of Destination
   Characteristics
Unemployment -0.006 0.026 -0.003 0.081
Rate (0.004) (0.103) (0.003) (0.097)
Per capita Income -0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Country -0.009 -1.591*** -0.012 0.560
Education (0.013) (0.445) (0.012) (0.642)
Population 0.001** 0.018 0.000 0.041**
(0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.019)
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Table D.3 (Continued)
Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LFP Weekly Hours LFP Weekly Hours
Individualism -0.002** -0.042 0.001 0.017
(0.001) (0.042) (0.001) (0.045)
Ethnolinguistic 0.121* 0.748 0.135** 6.339*
Fragmentation (0.065) (2.645) (0.065) (3.192)
Democratic 0.002 -0.059 -0.002* -0.106*
(0.002) (0.045) (0.001) (0.059)
French Legal Origin -0.020 2.518 -0.073 -0.264
(0.041) (1.701) (0.058) (1.433)
Socialist/Communist 0.021 8.096*** -0.101 -1.331
Legal Origin (0.102) (2.439) (0.064) (3.227)
German Legal Origin -0.006 3.439** -0.057 1.084
(0.053) (1.586) (0.050) (1.814)
Scandinavian Legal 0.037 9.306*** -0.006 4.142*
Origin (0.073) (2.210) (0.047) (2.340)
% Catholic 1980 0.001 -0.053** 0.001 -0.034*
(0.001) (0.021) (0.000) (0.017)
% Muslim 1980 -0.004*** -0.267*** -0.002* -0.007
(0.001) (0.088) (0.001) (0.030)
% Protestant 1980 0.002** -0.113*** 0.001 -0.080**
(0.001) (0.024) (0.001) (0.031)
N 3770 2909 3295 2738
Average Tax – Average personal income tax and social security contribution rate on gross labor income for a
single person without a dependent (OECD Tax Database Table 5).
Standard errors clustered at the country of origin are in parentheses. The estimations use sampling weights and
include survey year dummies. * p < 0.1, ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
103
VITA
Luiza Valeriyevna Pogorelova was born in Volgograd, Russian Federation in 1990.  She attended
American University in Bulgaria, in Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria, where she earned her Bachelor of Arts in Economics
and Business Administration in 2011.  That same year she entered graduate school in the Department of Economics
at Louisiana State University.  She received her M.S. in Economics in 2013.  Her advisor during her doctoral studies
was Dr. Naci Mocan.  She anticipates graduating from Louisiana State University with a degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Economics in August 2016.
